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<!DOCTYPE html>
<!-- Inferencium - Website - About -->
<!-- Version: 10.0.1 -->
<!-- Version: 10.0.2-alpha.1 -->
<!-- Copyright 2022 Jake Winters -->
<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause -->
@ -90,30 +90,21 @@
<section id="about_me">
<h2><a href="#about_me">About Me</a></h2>
<img class="avatar" src="asset/img/avatar/inference.png" alt="My avatar."/>
<p>I am Jake Winters, also known by my pseudonym
"Inference", a security researcher based in United
<p>I am Jake Winters, also known by my pseudonym "Inference", a security researcher based in United
Kingdom.</p>
<p>I am the founder, lead developer, and administrator, of
Inferencium.</p>
<p>All opinions are my own, and are not necessarily shared
with projects or people I am affiliated with.</p>
<p>I write about my research and experience in cybersecurity
and also physical security. Most of my postings are
security-related, but I occasionally post about other
aspects of my life.</p>
<p>I am an open source advocate for the preservation and
modifiability of source code. I believe source code should
be considered human knowledge as much as past knowledge and
teachings were; it is how modern humanity survives and runs.
Source code being modifiable allows it to be adapted for use
by anyone, whether to add features, harden it for increased
security and/or privacy, or provide accessibility for
disabled users.</p>
<p>I am also a modular design advocate for the ability to
securely and robustly make changes to hardware and software
without the entire system being affected.</p>
<p>I run multiple XMPP channels; a directory of channels can
be found on the
<p>I am the founder, lead developer, and administrator, of Inferencium.</p>
<p>All opinions are my own, and are not necessarily shared with projects or people I am affiliated
with.</p>
<p>I write about my research and experience in cybersecurity and also physical security. Most of my
postings are security-related, but I occasionally post about other aspects of my life.</p>
<p>I am an open source advocate for the preservation and modifiability of source code. I believe
source code should be considered human knowledge as much as past knowledge and teachings were; it is
how modern humanity survives and runs. Source code being modifiable allows it to be adapted for use
by anyone, whether to add features, harden it for increased security and/or privacy, or provide
accessibility for disabled users.</p>
<p>I am also a modular design advocate for the ability to securely and robustly make changes to
hardware and software without the entire system being affected.</p>
<p>I run multiple XMPP channels; a directory of channels can be found on the
<a href="https://inferencium.net/directory.xhtml">directory</a>
webpage.</p>
<p>If you wish to contact me for any reason, you can use my
@ -123,14 +114,11 @@
<h2><a href="#date_time">Date and Time</a></h2>
<p>All dates and times across my services are
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISO_8601">ISO 8601</a>-compliant.
The short-form format <code>YYYY-MM-DD</code> is used for
dates, and <code>hh:mm:ss</code> is used for times, with
display of seconds being based on required level of
accuracy. The full expression may be used when necessary;
<code>YYYYMMDDThhmmssZ</code> (UTC without offset),
<code>YYYYMMDDThhmmss+hhmm</code> (with positive offset), or
<code>YYYYMMDDThhmmss-hhmm</code> (with negative
offset).</p>
The short-form format <code>YYYY-MM-DD</code> is used for dates, and <code>hh:mm:ss</code> is used
for times, with display of seconds being based on required level of accuracy. The full expression
may be used when necessary; <code>YYYYMMDDThhmmssZ</code> (UTC without offset),
<code>YYYYMMDDThhmmss+hhmm</code> (with positive offset), or <code>YYYYMMDDThhmmss-hhmm</code> (with
negative offset).</p>
</section>
<section id="languages">
<h2><a href="#languages">Languages</a></h2>
@ -145,100 +133,69 @@
languages whenever possible.</p>
<section id="languages-markup-xhtml">
<h4><a href="#languages-markup-xhtml">XHTML</a></h4>
<p>XHTML is preferred for most content
due to its HTML-based design and syntax,
with advantages over HTML, including
strict parsing checks which assist with
achieving code-correctness, and being
XML-compliant to allow widespread usage
even outside of the intended HTML-based
use case.</p>
<p>HTML has multiple flaws, including
allowing broken code to be loaded in the
user's web browser, not informing the
developer of broken code or mismatching
tags, and using non-standard, highly
permissive syntax which is
non-portable. XHTML mitigates or
completely fixes these issues via
its XML namespace.</p>
<p>XHTML is preferred for most content due to its HTML-based design and syntax, with
advantages over HTML, including strict parsing checks which assist with achieving
code-correctness, and being XML-compliant to allow widespread usage even outside of
the intended HTML-based use case.</p>
<p>HTML has multiple flaws, including allowing broken code to be loaded in the
user's web browser, not informing the developer of broken code or mismatching tags,
and using non-standard, highly-permissive syntax which is non-portable. XHTML
mitigates or completely fixes these issues via its XML namespace.</p>
</section>
<section id="languages-markup-asciidoc">
<h4><a href="#languages-markup-asciidoc">AsciiDoc</a></h4>
<p>AsciiDoc is used when portability is
a concern, as it allows easy conversion
to other file formats, including HTML
and PDF. AsciiDoc can also be read
as-is, due to it having clean markup and
high readability when viewed as
plaintext.</p>
<p>AsciiDoc is used when portability is a concern, as it allows easy conversion to
other file formats, including HTML and PDF. AsciiDoc can also be read as-is, due to
it having clean markup and high readability when viewed as plaintext.</p>
</section>
</section>
<section id="languages-programming">
<h3><a href="#languages-programming">Programming</a></h3>
<p>The following programming languages are used in my code, with
rationale provided for the usage of each language.</p>
<p>Note that derivations of non-Inferencium codebases, such as
forks, may not contain the programming languages listed here due
to the work involved in replacing all code, but will be
rewritten whenever possible, and new code will be written in my
preferred languages whenever possible.</p>
<p>The following programming languages are used in my code, with rationale provided for the
usage of each language.</p>
<p>Note that derivations of non-Inferencium codebases, such as forks, may not contain the
programming languages listed here due to the work involved in replacing all code, but will
be rewritten whenever possible, and new code will be written in my preferred languages
whenever possible.</p>
<section id="languages-programming-rust">
<h4><a href="#languages-programming-rust">Rust</a></h4>
<p>Rust is a partially object-oriented
programming language with a focus on
security and performance. It has strict
compile-time checks to verify the
memory-safety and thread-safety of code,
is memory-efficient, has no garbage
collection, is highly portable, has
great support for integration with other
languages, and is suitable for both
high-level and low-level code.</p>
<p>Rust is the modern replacement for
C++.</p>
<p>Rust is a partially object-oriented programming language with a focus on security
and performance. It has strict compile-time checks to verify the memory-safety and
thread-safety of code, is memory-efficient, has no garbage collection, is highly
portable, has great support for integration with other languages, and is suitable
for both high-level and low-level code.</p>
<p>Rust is the modern replacement for C++.</p>
</section>
<section id="languages-programming-go">
<h4><a href="#languages-programming-go">Go</a></h4>
<p>Go is a functional programming
language with a focus on performance. It
is easy to use, has garbage collection,
allows clean codebases, and is suitable
for high-level code.</p>
<p>Go is the modern replacement for
C.</p>
<p>Go is a functional programming language with a focus on performance. It is easy
to use, has garbage collection, allows clean codebases, and is suitable for
high-level code.</p>
<p>Go is the modern replacement for C.</p>
</section>
</section>
</section>
<section id="licensing">
<h2><a href="#licensing">Licensing</a></h2>
<p>I care about upstreaming and sharing code, strongly
preferring licenses which have high license compatibility in
order to permit sharing code with as many other projects as
possible; for this reason, permissive licenses are my
preferred choice, while avoiding copyleft licenses and other
licenses which place restrictions on how my code may be
used, and prevent me from including important proprietary
code, such as firmware, which can patch security
vulnerabilities, privacy issues, and stability issues.</p>
<p>All of my code is and will be permissively licensed
unless specific circumstances make it impractical or
infeasible to do so. My goal is to share code which has the
least amount of restrictions as possible, to allow wider
propagation of my code and allow more use cases and
possibilities, as well as ensuring proprietary code,
whenever required, is permitted to be included and/or linked
to.</p>
<p>I care about upstreaming and sharing code, strongly preferring licenses which have high license
compatibility in order to permit sharing code with as many other projects as possible; for this
reason, permissive licenses are mypreferred choice, while avoiding copyleft licenses and other
licenses which place restrictions on how my code may be used, and prevent me from including
important proprietary code, such as firmware, which can patch security vulnerabilities, privacy
issues, and stability issues.</p>
<p>All of my code is and will be permissively-licensed unless specific circumstances make it
impractical or infeasible to do so. My goal is to share code which has the least amount of
restrictions as possible, to allow wider propagation of my code and allow more use cases and
possibilities, as well as ensuring proprietary code, whenever required, is permitted to be included
and/or linked to.</p>
<p><a href="https://iso.org/standard/81870.html">ISO 5962:2021</a>
is used for licensing, in the format
<code>SPDX-License-Identifier: <var>&lt;license&gt;</var></code>;
see the
<code>SPDX-License-Identifier: <var>&lt;license&gt;</var></code>; see the
<a href="https://spdx.org/licenses/">SPDX License List</a>
for the full list of available licenses under this
standard.</p>
<p>My preferred licenses and rationale for using them are
below; any licenses not listed are chosen on a case-by-case
basis.</p>
<p>My preferred licenses and rationale for using them are below; any licenses not listed are chosen
on a case-by-case basis.</p>
<section id="licensing-code">
<h3><a href="#licensing-code">Code</a></h3>
<section id="licensing-code-bsd3clause">
@ -246,17 +203,11 @@
<p><b>SPDX License Identifier:</b> <code>BSD-3-Clause</code></p>
<p><b>Type: Permissive</b></p>
<p><a href="https://spdx.org/licenses/BSD-3-Clause.html">BSD 3-Clause License</a>
is a highly permissive license which
allows content licensed under it to be
used in any way, whether in source or
binary form, and allows sublicensing
under a different license, with the only
restrictions being the original
copyright notice must be kept in order
to attribute the original creator of the
licensed content, and the name of the
project and/or its contributors may not
be used to endorse or promote products
is a highly permissive license which allows content licensed under it to be used in
any way, whether in source or binary form, and allows sublicensing under a different
license, with the only restrictions being the original copyright notice must be kept
in order to attribute the original creator of the licensed content, and the name of
the project and/or its contributors may not be used to endorse or promote products
derived from the original project.</p>
</section>
<section id="licensing-code-gpl2.0only">
@ -264,31 +215,18 @@
<p><b>SPDX License Identifier:</b> <code>GPL-2.0-only</code></p>
<p><b>Type: Copyleft</b></p>
<p><a href="https://spdx.org/licenses/GPL-2.0-only.html">GNU General Public License v2.0</a>
is a strong copyleft license which
restricts use of content licensed under
it by requiring all source code of the
content to be publicly available, making
binary-only form and inclusion of
proprietary code impossible, requiring
all derivatives to be licensed under the
same license (allowing sublicensing
under only newer GPL licenses if
<code>GPL-2.0-or-later</code> is
specified in the SPDX License
Identifier), and requiring the original
copyright notice to be kept in order to
attribute the original creator of the
licensed content.</p>
<p>Due to the restrictive and invasive
nature of this license, it is avoided
unless such restrictions would be
beneficial to my code; whenever this is
the case, the GNU General Public License
v2.0 will be used, rather than the more
restrictive
is a strong copyleft license which restricts use of content licensed under it by
requiring all source code of the content to be publicly available, making
binary-only form and inclusion of proprietary code impossible, requiring all
derivatives to be licensed under the same license (allowing sublicensing under only
newer GPL licenses if <code>GPL-2.0-or-later</code> is specified in the SPDX License
Identifier), and requiring the original copyright notice to be kept in order to
attribute the original creator of the licensed content.</p>
<p>Due to the restrictive and invasive nature of this license, it is avoided unless
such restrictions would be beneficial to my code; whenever this is the case, the GNU
General Public License v2.0 will be used, rather than the more restrictive
<a href="https://spdx.org/licenses/GPL-3.0-only.html">GNU General Public License v3.0</a>,
and relicensing derivatives under the
GNU General Public License v3.0 will be
and relicensing derivatives under the GNU General Public License v3.0 will be
disallowed.</p>
</section>
</section>
@ -299,24 +237,18 @@
<p><b>SPDX License Identifier:</b> <code>CC-BY-4.0</code></p>
<p><b>Type: Permissive</b></p>
<p><a href="https://spdx.org/licenses/CC-BY-4.0.html">Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International</a>
is a highly permissive license which
allows content licensed under it to be
used in any way, in any medium, with the
only restriction being the original
copyright notice must be kept in order
to attribute the original creator of the
licensed content.</p>
is a highly-permissive license which allows content licensed under it to be used in
any way, in any medium, with the only restriction being the original copyright
notice must be kept in order to attribute the original creator of the licensed
content.</p>
</section>
</section>
<section id="licensing-open_source_vs_free_software">
<h3><a href="#licensing-open_source_vs_free_software">Do I Distinguish Between Open Source and Free Software?</a></h3>
<p>No. If code is not released under an open-source
license and places restrictions on how the code may be
used, it is either source-available (if viewing the code
is permitted) or proprietary. "Free software" only
causes confusion and exists to push an ideology by a
specific group of people. If software isn't "free", it's
not open-source, either.</p>
<p>No. If code is not released under an open-source license and places restrictions on how
the code may be used, it is either source-available (if viewing the code is permitted) or
proprietary. "Free software" only causes confusion and exists to push an ideology by a
specific group of people. If software isn't "free", it's not open-source, either.</p>
</section>
</section>
<section id="versioning">
@ -325,131 +257,105 @@
<h3><a href="#versioning-numbering_scheme">What is the Numbering Scheme?</a></h3>
<p>All code uses
<a href="https://semver.org">Semantic Versioning</a>.
The numbering scheme divided into 3 blocks (herein referred to
as Block 0, Block 1, and Block 2, in left-to-right order); the
version blocks are separated by periods. When a version number
block is incremented, all blocks to the right of it are reset to
0. The legacy versioning scheme was a similar numerical
versioning scheme which lacked standardisation.</p>
<p>Block 0 contains the <code><var>MAJOR</var></code> version;
this number is incremented whenever an API-incompatible change
is made to the code.</p>
<p>Block 1 contains the <code><var>MINOR</var></code> version;
this number is incremented whenever an API-compatible,
substantial change is made to the code, such as adding a
The numbering scheme is divided into 3 blocks (herein referred to as Block 0, Block 1, and
Block 2, in left-to-right order); the version blocks are separated by periods. When a
version number block is incremented, all blocks to the right of it are reset to 0. The
legacy versioning scheme was a similar numerical versioning scheme which lacked
standardisation.</p>
<p>Block 0 contains the <code><var>MAJOR</var></code> version; this number is incremented
whenever an API-incompatible change is made to the code.</p>
<p>Block 1 contains the <code><var>MINOR</var></code> version; this number is incremented
whenever an API-compatible, substantial change is made to the code, such as adding a
feature.</p>
<p>Block 2 contains the <code><var>PATCH</var></code> version;
this number is incremented whenever an API-compatible,
unsubstantial change is made to the code, such as fixing or
<p>Block 2 contains the <code><var>PATCH</var></code> version; this number is incremented
whenever an API-compatible, unsubstantial change is made to the code, such as fixing or
optimising the code.</p>
<p>Development and pre-release versions are suffixed with
a hyphen, followed by their phase, a period, then the version of
that phase; for example, <code>-alpha.<var>n</var></code> for an
alpha version, <code>-beta.<var>n</var></code> for a beta
version, and <code>-rc.<var>n</var></code> for a release
candidate version, with <code><var>n</var></code> being a
non-negative integer. Stable versions have no suffix.</p>
<p>Development and pre-release versions are suffixed with a hyphen, followed by their phase,
a period, then the version of that phase; for example, <code>-alpha.<var>n</var></code> for
an alpha version, <code>-beta.<var>n</var></code> for a beta version, and
<code>-rc.<var>n</var></code> for a release candidate version, with
<code><var>n</var></code> being a non-negative integer. Stable versions have no suffix.</p>
</section>
<section id="versioning-phases">
<h3><a href="#versioning-phases">What Are the Phases?</a></h3>
<p>There are 4 phases of development. Each phase typically has
its own branch in each source code repository. The phases are as
follows:</p>
<p>There are 4 phases of development. Each phase typically has its own branch in each source
code repository. The phases are as follows:</p>
<ol>
<li>Alpha: Pre-alpha development and alpha testing
occurs in this phase. Features are added, modified,
and/or removed. Fixes and optimisations may also occur
if they are caught during this phase. This is where the
majority of changes occur and where the fine-grained
commits can be found. Breakage is highly likely within
this phase as it makes no attempt to be stable or usable
due to being where the most rapid development occurs.
Code is tested internally in a fine-grained manner and
is moved to the next phase only when it is deemed
feature-complete and reasonably stable for broader
public testing. If you would like to assist in testing
code in this phase, you must use the code and/or tags
from the source code repositories due to it not being
available publicly outside of them.</li>
<li>Beta: Feature-complete testing occurs in this phase.
Only bug fixes and optimisations occur in this phase,
such as stability and security fixes. This phase is
classified as stable enough for broad public testing and
is made available publicly in many cases without having
to use the source code repositories. Since this phase
contains only feature-complete code, no features will be
added, modified, or removed in this phase.</li>
<li>Release candidate (RC): Feature-complete testing
occurs in this phase. Code in the RC phase is often
stable enough for production usage, but is not yet
completely acceptable to be classified as stable by my
standards. This phase is often skipped due to most bugs
being caught in the beta phase, but will be used should
the need arise for finer-grained testing beyond what the
beta phase can provide. Like the beta phase, code in
this phase is available publicly without requiring usage
of the source code repositories.</li>
<li>Stable: Feature-complete and well-tested code is
moved to this phase. Code in this phase is deemed to be
stable enough for production usage and full support is
<li>Alpha: Pre-alpha development and alpha testing occurs in this phase. Features
are added, modified, and/or removed. Fixes and optimisations may also occur if they
are caught during this phase. This is where the majority of changes occur and where
the fine-grained commits can be found. Breakage is highly likely within this phase
as it makes no attempt to be stable or usable due to being where the most rapid
development occurs. Code is tested internally in a fine-grained manner and is moved
to the next phase only when it is deemed feature-complete and reasonably stable for
broader public testing. If you would like to assist in testing code in this phase,
you must use the code and/or tags from the source code repositories due to it not
being available publicly outside of them.</li>
<li>Beta: Feature-complete testing occurs in this phase. Only bug fixes and
optimisations occur in this phase, such as stability and security fixes. This phase
is classified as stable enough for broad public testing and is made available
publicly in many cases without having to use the source code repositories. Since
this phase contains only feature-complete code, no features will be added, modified,
or removed in this phase.</li>
<li>Release candidate (RC): Feature-complete testing occurs in this phase. Code in
the RC phase is often stable enough for production usage, but is not yet completely
acceptable to be classified as stable by my standards. This phase is often skipped
due to most bugs being caught in the beta phase, but will be used should the need
arise for finer-grained testing beyond what the beta phase can provide. Like the
beta phase, code in this phase is available publicly without requiring usage of the
source code repositories.</li>
<li>Stable: Feature-complete and well-tested code is moved to this phase. Code in
this phase is deemed to be stable enough for production usage and full support is
provided.</li>
</ol>
<p>When development of a new version has begun, the code within
the alpha phase is rebased onto the most recent code from the
stable phase before work commences. This cycle continues for the
lifetime of the code.</p>
<p>When development of a new version has begun, the code within the alpha phase is rebased
onto the most recent code from the stable phase before work commences. This cycle continues
for the lifetime of the code.</p>
</section>
</section>
<section id="services">
<h2><a href="#services">Services</a></h2>
<p>This list contains the policies and practices of my services.</p>
<p>My policies and practices are heavily security- and privacy-focused, with
improvements made on an ongoing basis as new technologies, protocols, and
software become available.</p>
<p>My policies and practices are heavily security- and privacy-focused, with improvements made on an
ongoing basis as new technologies, protocols, and software become available.</p>
<h3 id="services-websites"><a href="#services-websites">Websites</a></h3>
<ul>
<li>Unnecessary logging avoided (only logs required for security
and debugging purposes)</li>
<li>Unnecessary logging avoided (only logs required for security and debugging
purposes)</li>
<li>All server logs purged every 14 days</li>
<li>User IP addresses used only for security and debugging
purposes (purged along with logs)</li>
<li>User IP addresses used only for security and debugging purposes (purged along with
logs)</li>
<li>All connections made via
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#TLS_1.3">TLS 1.3</a>
only to ensure the most secure
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Authenticated_encryption">AEAD</a>
ciphers are used, along with
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forward_secrecy">forward secrecy</a></li>
<li>All connections made via high-security AEAD ciphers,
preferring AES-256-GCM for devices with AES
hardware acceleration, and ChaCha20-Poly1305 for devices without
AES hardware acceleration, with AES-128-GCM as a fallback
(AES-128-GCM is mandated for TLS 1.3 by
<li>All connections made via high-security AEAD ciphers, preferring AES-256-GCM for
devices with AES hardware acceleration, and ChaCha20-Poly1305 for devices without AES
hardware acceleration, with AES-128-GCM as a fallback (AES-128-GCM is mandated for TLS
1.3 by
<a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8446#section-9.1">IETF RFC8446 section 9.1</a>)</li>
<li>All connections are made via high-security key exchange
protocols, preferring X25519, with secp256r1 as a fallback
(secp256r1 is mandated for TLS 1.3 by IETF RFC8446 section
9.1)</li>
<li>All connections are made via high-security key exchange protocols, preferring
X25519, with secp256r1 as a fallback (secp256r1 is mandated for TLS 1.3 by IETF RFC8446
section 9.1)</li>
<li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Domain_Name_System_Security_Extensions">Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC)</a>
enabled to provide a root-of-trust for encryption and
authentication for domain and server configuration</li>
enabled to provide a root-of-trust for encryption and authentication for domain and
server configuration</li>
<li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_Certification_Authority_Authorization">Certification Authority Authorization (CAA)</a>
records enabled to prevent all certificate authorities other
than
records enabled to prevent all certificate authorities other than
<a href="https://letsencrypt.org/">Let's Encrypt</a> from
issuing TLS certificates for my domains</li>
<li><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SSHFP_record">Secure Shell fingerprint (SSHFP)</a>
records enabled to provide a DNS-based root-of-trust for SSH
connections to my domains</li>
<li>Referrer headers disabled to prevent knowing where a user
was redirected from</li>
<li>All content sourced from my own domains, with third-party
content prohibited via
records enabled to provide a DNS-based root-of-trust for SSH connections to my
domains</li>
<li>Referrer headers disabled to prevent knowing where a user was redirected from</li>
<li>All content sourced from my own domains, with third-party content prohibited via
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Content_Security_Policy">Content Security Policy</a>
configuration</li>
<li>All servers physically under my control (no VPS or other
hosting providers)</li>
<li>No proprietary services, ensuring I have complete control
over my services, and vendor lock-in does not occur</li>
<li>All servers physically under my control (no VPS or other hosting providers)</li>
<li>No proprietary services, ensuring I have complete control over my services, and
vendor lock-in does not occur</li>
</ul>
</section>
<section id="recommendations">
@ -480,102 +386,78 @@
<th id="hardware-smartphone-smartphone">Smartphone</th>
<th id ="google-pixel" headers="hardware hardware-smartphone-smartphone">
<img src="asset/img/google-pixel_8_pro.png" width="100" height="100" alt="Front and rear view of a Google Pixel 8 Pro in Obsidian colour"/><br/>
Google Pixel
</th>
Google Pixel</th>
<td class="desc" headers="hardware-description google-pixel">
<h5>Security/Privacy</h5>
<p>Google Pixel devices are the best
Android devices available on the market
for
<p>Google Pixel devices are the best Android devices
available on the market for
<a href="https://security.googleblog.com/2021/10/pixel-6-setting-new-standard-for-mobile.html">security and privacy</a>.</p>
<p>They allow locking the bootloader
with a
<p>They allow locking the bootloader with a
<a href="https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/avb/+/master/README.md#pixel-2-and-later">custom Android Verified Boot (AVB) key</a>
in order to preserve security and
privacy features when installing a
custom operating system, such as
in order to preserve security and privacy features when
installing a custom operating system, such as
<a href="https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/verifiedboot/">verified boot</a>
which verifies that the OS has not been
corrupted or tampered with, and
which verifies that the OS has not been corrupted or tampered with, and
<a href="https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection">rollback protection</a>
which prevents an adversary from rolling
back the OS or firmware version to a
previous version with known security
which prevents an adversary from rolling back the OS or
firmware version to a previous version with known security
vulnerabilities.</p>
<p>They also include a
<a href="https://developer.android.com/training/articles/keystore#HardwareSecurityModule">hardware security module</a>
(Titan M2, improving on the previous
generation
(Titan M2, improving on the previous generation
<a href="https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/building-titan-better-security-through.html">Titan M</a>)
which is extremely resistant to both
remote and physical attacks due to being
completely isolated from the rest of the
system, including the operating system.
Titan M2 ensures that the device cannot
be remotely compromised by requiring the
side buttons of the device to be
physically pressed for some sensitive
operations. Titan M2 also takes the role
of
which is extremely resistant to both remote and physical
attacks due to being completely isolated from the rest of
the system, including the operating system. Titan M2 ensures
that the device cannot be remotely compromised by requiring
the side buttons of the device to be physically pressed for
some sensitive operations. Titan M2 also takes the role of
<a href="https://source.android.com/docs/security/best-practices/hardware#strongbox-keymaster">Android StrongBox Keymaster</a>,
a
<a href="https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/keystore">hardware-backed Keystore</a>
containing sensitive user keys which are
unavailable to the OS or apps running on
it without authorisation from Titan M2
containing sensitive user keys which are unavailable to the
OS or apps running on it without authorisation from Titan M2
itself.
<a href="https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2018/05/insider-attack-resistance.html">Insider attack resistance</a>
ensures that Titan M2 firmware can be
flashed only if the user PIN/password is
already known, making it impossible to
backdoor the device without already
knowing these secrets.</p>
<p>Google Pixel device kernels are
compiled with
ensures that Titan M2 firmware can be flashed only if the
user PIN/password is already known, making it impossible to
backdoor the device without already knowing these secrets.</p>
<p>Google Pixel device kernels are compiled with
<a href="https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2018/10/control-flow-integrity-in-android-kernel.html">forward-edge control-flow integrity</a>
and
<a href="https://security.googleblog.com/2019/10/protecting-against-code-reuse-in-linux_30.html">backward-edge control-flow integrity</a>
to prevent code reuse attacks against
the kernel. MAC address randomisation is
to prevent code reuse attacks against the kernel. MAC
address randomisation is
<a href="https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2017/04/changes-to-device-identifiers-in.html">implemented well, along with minimal probe requests and randomised initial sequence numbers</a>.</p>
<p>Google releases
<a href="https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/pixel/">guaranteed monthly security updates</a>,
ensuring Google Pixel devices are
up-to-date and quickly protected against
security vulnerabilities.</p>
<p>Pixel 6-series and 7-series devices
are a large improvement over the already
very secure and private previous
generation Pixel devices. They replace
ARM-based Titan M with RISC-V-based
Titan M2, reducing trust by removing ARM
from the equation. Titan M2 is more
resiliant to attacks than Titan M, and
is
ensuring Google Pixel devices are up-to-date and quickly
protected against security vulnerabilities.</p>
<p>Pixel 6-series and 7-series devices are a large
improvement over the already very secure and private
previous generation Pixel devices. They replace ARM-based
Titan M with RISC-V-based Titan M2, reducing trust by
removing ARM from the equation. Titan M2 is more resiliant
to attacks than Titan M, and is
<a href="https://www.tuv-nederland.nl/assets/files/cerfiticaten/2022/09/nscib-cc-22-0228971-cert-final.pdf">AVA_VAN.5 certified</a>,
the highest level of vulnerability
assessment. Google's in-house Tensor
System-on-Chip includes Tensor Security
Core, further improving device
security.</p>
the highest level of vulnerability assessment. Google's
in-house Tensor System-on-Chip includes Tensor Security
Core, further improving device security.</p>
<p>Pixel 8-series includes Armv9's
<a href="https://community.arm.com/arm-community-blogs/b/architectures-and-processors-blog/posts/enhanced-security-through-mte">Memory Tagging Extension</a>,
which dramatically increases device
security by eliminating up to 95% of all
security issues caused by
which dramatically increases device security by eliminating
up to 95% of all security issues caused by
memory-unsafety.</p>
<h5>Support</h5>
<p>Pixel 5a is supported for a
<a href="https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705#zippy=%2Cpixel-a-g-pixel-pixel-a-g-pixel-a-pixel-xl-pixel">minimum of 3 years from launch</a>.</p>
<p>Pixel 6-series, Pixel 7-series, Pixel
Fold, and Pixel Tablet are supported for
a
<p>Pixel 6-series, Pixel 7-series, Pixel Fold, and Pixel
Tablet are supported for a
<a href="https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705#zippy=%2Cpixel-a-pixel-pixel-pro-pixel-a-pixel-pixel-pro-pixel-fold">minimum of 5 years from launch</a>.</p>
<p>Pixel 8-series is supported for a
<a href="https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705#zippy=%2Cpixel-pro">minimum of 7 years from launch</a>.</p>
</td>
<td headers="hardware-smartphone-source_model google-pixel">
</td>
<td headers="hardware-smartphone-source_model google-pixel"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
@ -608,50 +490,41 @@
<th id="software-pc-os">Operating system</th>
<th id="gentoo_linux" headers="software-pc software-pc-os">
<img src="asset/img/logo/gentoo_linux.png" width="100" height="100" alt="Gentoo Linux logo"/><br/>
Gentoo Linux
</th>
Gentoo Linux</th>
<td class="desc" headers="software-pc-description gentoo_linux">
<p><a href="https://www.gentoo.org/">Gentoo Linux</a>
is a highly modular, source-based, Linux-based
operating system which allows vast customisation
to tailor the operating system to suit your
specific needs. There are many advantages to
such an operating system, with the most notable
being the ability to optimise the software for
security, privacy, performance, or power usage;
however, there are effectively unlimited other
use cases, or a combination of multiple use
cases.</p>
<p>I have focused on security hardening and
privacy hardening, placing performance below
those aspects, although my system is still very
performant. Some of the hardening I apply
includes
is a highly modular, source-based, Linux-based operating system
which allows vast customisation to tailor the operating system
to suit your specific needs. There are many advantages to such
an operating system, with the most notable being the ability to
optimise the software for security, privacy, performance, or
power usage; however, there are effectively unlimited other use
cases, or a combination of multiple use cases.</p>
<p>I have focused on security hardening and privacy hardening,
placing performance below those aspects, although my system is
still very performant. Some of the hardening I apply includes
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Buffer_overflow_protection">stack protection</a>,
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integer_overflow">signed integer overflow trapping</a>,
and GrapheneOS'
<a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc/">hardened_malloc</a>
memory allocator.</p>
<p>You can find my Gentoo Linux configurations
in my
<p>You can find my Gentoo Linux configurations in my
<a href="https://src.inferencium.net/Inferencium/cfg/">configuration respository</a>.</p>
</td>
<td headers="software-pc-source_model gentoo_linux">
Open-source<br/>
(GPL-2.0-only)
</td>
(GPL-2.0-only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th id="software-web_browser">Web browser</th>
<th id="chromium" headers="software-pc software-web_browser">
<img src="asset/img/logo/chromium.png" width="100" height="100" alt="Chromium logo"/><br/>
Chromium
</th>
Chromium</th>
<td class="desc" headers="software-pc-description chromium">
<p><a href="https://chromium.org/">Chromium</a>
is a highly secure web browser which is often ahead
of other web browsers in security aspects. It has a
dedicated security team and a very impressive
is a highly secure web browser which is often ahead of other web
browsers in security aspects. It has a dedicated security team
and a very impressive
<a href="https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/brag-sheet/">security brag sheet</a>.
Chromium's security features include a strong
<a href="https://code.google.com/p/chromium/wiki/LinuxSandboxing">multi-layer sandbox</a>,
@ -659,11 +532,11 @@
<a href="https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/site-isolation">site isolation</a>,
<a href="https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/binding-integrity">Binding Integrity</a>
memory hardening, and
<a href="https://www.chromium.org/developers/testing/control-flow-integrity/">control-flow integrity (CFI)</a>.</p></td>
<a href="https://www.chromium.org/developers/testing/control-flow-integrity/">control-flow integrity (CFI)</a>.</p>
</td>
<td headers="software-pc-source_model chromium">
Open-source<br/>
(BSD-3-Clause)
</td>
(BSD-3-Clause)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
@ -693,146 +566,125 @@
<th id="software-smartphone-os">Operating system</th>
<th id="grapheneos" headers="software-smartphone software-smartphone-os">
<img src="asset/img/logo/grapheneos.png" width="100" height="100" alt="GrapheneOS logo"/><br/>
GrapheneOS
</th>
GrapheneOS</th>
<td class="desc" headers="software-smartphone-description grapheneos">
<p><a href="https://grapheneos.org/">GrapheneOS</a>
is a security-hardened, privacy-hardened,
secure-by-default, Android-based operating
system which implements extensive, systemic
security and privacy hardening to the Android
Open Source Project used as its base
codebase.</p>
<p>Its hardening includes closing gaps for apps
to access sensitive system information, a secure
app spawning feature which avoids sharing
address space layout and other secrets AOSP's
default Zygote app spawning model would share,
is a security-hardened, privacy-hardened, secure-by-default,
Android-based operating system which implements extensive,
systemic security and privacy hardening to the Android Open
Source Project used as its base codebase.</p>
<p>Its hardening includes closing gaps for apps to access
sensitive system information, a secure app spawning feature
which avoids sharing address space layout and other secrets
AOSP's default Zygote app spawning model would share,
<a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/kernel_gs-gs101/">hardened kernel</a>,
hardened memory allocator
(<a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc/">hardened_malloc</a>)
to protect against common memory corruption
vulnerabilities,
to protect against common memory corruption vulnerabilities,
<a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_bionic/">hardened Bionic standard C library</a>,
<a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_system_sepolicy/">stricter SELinux policies</a>,
and local and remote hardware-backed attestation
(<a href="https://attestation.app/about/">Auditor</a>)
to ensure the OS has not been corrupted or
tampered with.</p>
to ensure the OS has not been corrupted or tampered with.</p>
<p>GrapheneOS only supports
<a href="https://grapheneos.org/faq#device-support">high-security and well-supported devices</a>
which receive full support from their
manufacturers, including firmware updates, long
support lifecycles, secure hardware, and overall
high-security practices.</p>
<p>For an extensive list of features GrapheneOS
provides, visit its
which receive full support from their manufacturers, including
firmware updates, long support lifecycles, secure hardware, and
overall high-security practices.</p>
<p>For an extensive list of features GrapheneOS provides, visit
its
<a href="https://grapheneos.org/features/">official features list</a>
which provides extensive documentation.</p>
</td>
<td headers="software-smartphone-source_model grapheneos">
Open-source<br/>
(MIT)
</td>
(MIT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th id="software-smartphone-web_browser">Web browser</th>
<th id="vanadium" headers="software-smartphone software-smartphone-web_browser">
<img src="asset/img/logo/vanadium.png" width="100" height="100" alt="Vanadium logo"/><br/>
Vanadium
</th>
Vanadium</th>
<td class="desc" headers="software-smartphone-description vanadium">
<p>Vanadium is a security-hardened,
privacy-hardened, Chromium-based web browser
which utilises GrapheneOS' operating system
hardening to implement stronger defenses to the
already very secure Chromium web browser.</p>
<p>Its hardening alongside Chromium's base
security features includes
<p>Vanadium is a security-hardened, privacy-hardened,
Chromium-based web browser which utilises GrapheneOS' operating
system hardening to implement stronger defenses to the already
very secure Chromium web browser.</p>
<p>Its hardening alongside Chromium's base security features
includes
<a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/blob/13/patches/0081-Implement-UI-for-JIT-site-settings.patch">disabling JavaScript just-in-time (JIT) compilation by default</a>,
<a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/blob/13/patches/0051-stub-out-the-battery-status-API.patch">stubbing out the battery status API to prevent abuse of it</a>,
and
<a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/blob/13/patches/0084-Toggle-for-navigating-external-URL-in-incognito.patch">always-on Incognito mode as an option</a>.</p>
<p>Vanadium's source code, including its Chromium
patch-set, can be found in its
<p>Vanadium's source code, including its Chromium patch-set, can
be found in its
<a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/">official repository</a>.</p>
</td>
<td headers="software-smartphone-source_model vanadium">
Open-source<br/>
(GPL-2.0-only)
</td>
(GPL-2.0-only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th rowspan="2" id="software-smartphone-messenger">Messenger</th>
<th id="molly" headers="software-smartphone software-smartphone-messenger">
<img src="asset/img/logo/molly.png" width="100" height="100" alt="Molly logo"/><br/>
Molly
</th>
Molly</th>
<td class="desc" headers="software-smartphone-description molly">
<p><a href="https://molly.im/">Molly</a>
is a security-hardened, privacy-hardened
<a href="https://signal.org/">Signal</a>
client which hardens Signal by using a variety
of
client which hardens Signal by using a variety of
<a href="https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#features">unique features</a>,
allowing
<a href="https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/wiki/Data-Encryption-At-Rest">locking the database when not in use</a>,
and
<a href="https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android/blob/a81ff7d120adc9d427be17239107343146bad704/app/src/main/java/org/thoughtcrime/securesms/crypto/MasterSecretUtil.java#L91">utilising Android StrongBox</a>
to protect user keys using the device's hardware
security module.</p>
to protect user keys using the device's hardware security
module.</p>
<p>Molly is available in
<a href="https://github.com/mollyim/mollyim-android#free-and-open-source">2 flavours</a>:</p>
<ul>
<li>Molly, which includes the same
proprietary Google code as Signal to
support more features</li>
<li>Molly-FOSS, which removes the
proprietary Google code to provide an
entirely open-source client</li>
<li>Molly, which includes the same proprietary Google
code as Signal to support more features</li>
<li>Molly-FOSS, which removes the proprietary Google
code to provide an entirely open-source client</li>
</ul>
</td>
<td headers="software-smartphone-source_model molly">
Open-source<br/>
(GPL-3.0-only)
</td>
(GPL-3.0-only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th id="conversations" headers="software-smartphone software-smartphone-messenger">
<img src="asset/img/logo/conversations.png" width="100" height="100" alt="Conversations logo"/><br/>
Conversations
</th>
Conversations</th>
<td class="desc" headers="software-smartphone-description conversations">
<p><a href="https://conversations.im/">Conversations</a>
is a well-designed Android
<a href="https://xmpp.org/">XMPP</a>
client which serves as the de facto XMPP
reference client and has great usability.</p>
client which serves as the de facto XMPP reference client and
has great usability.</p>
</td>
<td headers="software-smartphone-source_model conversations">
Open-source<br/>
(GPL-3.0-only)
</td>
(GPL-3.0-only)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<th id="software-smartphone-viewer">Viewer</th>
<th id="gallery" headers="software-smartphone software-smartphone-viewer">
<img src="asset/img/logo/gallery.png" width="100" height="100" alt="Gallery logo"/><br/>
Gallery
</th>
Gallery</th>
<td class="desc" headers="software-smartphone-description gallery">
<p><a href="https://github.com/IacobIonut01/Gallery">Gallery</a>
is a lightweight image and video viewer with
image editing capabilities.</p>
<p>It has a clean and modern design without
including unnecessary features, and runs
smoothly. It provides both individual image and
video file view, and folder view.</p>
is a lightweight image and video viewer with image editing
capabilities.</p>
<p>It has a clean and modern design without including
unnecessary features, and runs smoothly. It provides both
individual image and video file view, and folder view.</p>
</td>
<td headers="software-smartphone-source_model gallery">
Open-source<br/>
(Apache-2.0)
</td>
(Apache-2.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
@ -841,28 +693,21 @@
</section>
<section id="recommendations-music">
<h3><a href="#recommendations-music">Music</a></h3>
<p>For a curated list of music I enjoy,
visit my
<p>For a curated list of music I enjoy, visit my
<a href="music.xhtml">music page</a>.</p>
</section>
</section>
<section id="gnulinux_or_linux">
<h2><a href="#gnulinux_or_linux">Is it GNU/Linux or Just Linux?</a></h2>
<p>It's just Linux. GNU is unrelated to Linux, which is a
kernel developed by
<p>It's just Linux. GNU is unrelated to Linux, which is a kernel developed by
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linus_Torvalds">Linus Torvalds</a>.
Linux can be used entirely without GNU software in
userspace, and the kernel can be compiled without the use of
GNU tools. Just because GNU tools were used to initally
develop and compile the kernel, and were initially the only
available tools for userspace, does not make this true
today, and it never made GNU a part of Linux itself at any
point of time.</p>
<p>Where are all of the other forward-slashes for every
other piece of software on a Linux-based system which makes
it just as usable? If a system is running "GNU/Linux", it
should be using more than a single forward-slash when there
is more to the system than only GNU.</p>
Linux can be used entirely without GNU software in userspace, and the kernel can be compiled without
the use of GNU tools. Just because GNU tools were used to initally develop and compile the kernel,
and were initially the only available tools for userspace, does not make this true today, and it
never made GNU a part of Linux itself at any point of time.</p>
<p>Where are all of the other forward-slashes for every other piece of software on a Linux-based
system which makes it just as usable? If a system is running "GNU/Linux", it should be using more
than a single forward-slash when there is more to the system than only GNU.</p>
</section>
<div class="sitemap-small"><a href="sitemap.xhtml">Sitemap</a></div>
</body>

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<!-- Version: 8.0.1-alpha.1 -->
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<!-- Inferencium - Website - Blog - #0 -->
<!-- Version: 9.0.0 -->
<!-- Version: 9.0.1-alpha.1 -->
<!-- Copyright 2022 Jake Winters -->
<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause -->
@ -48,39 +48,35 @@
</nav>
<section id="introduction">
<h2><a href="#introduction">Introduction</a></h2>
<p>The world has become a dangerous, privacy invading, human rights stripping,
totalitarian place; in order to combat this, people are joining a growing, and
dangerous, trend, which I will refer to in this post as the "Free and Open
Source (FOSS) movement". With that stated, I will now debunk the misinformation
being spread inside of this extremely flawed movement.</p>
<p>The world has become a dangerous, privacy invading, human rights stripping, totalitarian
place; in order to combat this, people are joining a growing, and dangerous, trend, which I will
refer to in this post as the "Free and Open Source (FOSS) movement". With that stated, I will
now debunk the misinformation being spread inside of this extremely flawed movement.</p>
<p>The
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_software">FOSS</a>
movement is an attempt to regain
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privacy">privacy</a>
and
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control_(psychology)">control</a>
over our devices and data, but the entire concept of FOSS-only, at the current
time, is severely, and dangerously, flawed. What the FOSS community does not
seem to understand is the fact that most FOSS software cares not about
over our devices and data, but the entire concept of FOSS-only, at the current time, is
severely, and dangerously, flawed. What the FOSS community does not seem to understand is the
fact that most FOSS software cares not about
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security">security</a>.
"Security"; keep that word in mind as you progress through this article. What is
security? Security is being safe and secure from adversaries and unwanted
consequences; security protects our rights and allows us to protect ourselves.
Without security, we have no protection, and without protection, we have a lack
of certainty of everything else, including privacy and control, which is what
the FOSS movement is seeking.</p>
<p>FOSS projects rarely take security into account; they simply look at the
surface level, rather than the actual
"Security"; keep that word in mind as you progress through this article. What is security?
Security is being safe and secure from adversaries and unwanted consequences; security protects
our rights and allows us to protect ourselves. Without security, we have no protection, and
without protection, we have a lack of certainty of everything else, including privacy and
control, which is what the FOSS movement is seeking.</p>
<p>FOSS projects rarely take security into account; they simply look at the surface level,
rather than the actual
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root_cause_analysis">root cause</a>
of the issues they are attempting to fight against. In this case, the focus is
on privacy and control. Without security mechanisms to protect the privacy
features and the ability to control your devices and data, it can be stripped
away as if it never existed in the first place, which, inevitably, leads us back
to the beginning, and the cycle repeats. With this
of the issues they are attempting to fight against. In this case, the focus is on privacy and
control. Without security mechanisms to protect the privacy features and the ability to control
your devices and data, it can be stripped away as if it never existed in the first place, which,
inevitably, leads us back to the beginning, and the cycle repeats. With this
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ideology">ideology</a>,
privacy and control will <em>never</em> be achieved. There is no foundation to
build privacy or control upon. It is impossible to build a solid, freedom
respecting platform on this model.</p>
privacy and control will <em>never</em> be achieved. There is no foundation to build privacy or
control upon. It is impossible to build a solid, freedom respecting platform on this model.</p>
</section>
<section id="examples">
<h2><a href="#examples">Examples</a></h2>
@ -88,107 +84,91 @@
<h3><a href="#examples-smartphones">Smartphones</a></h3>
<p>A FOSS phone, especially so-called
"<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux_for_mobile_devices#Smartphones">Linux phones</a>"
are completely detrimental to privacy and control, because they
do not have the security necessary to enforce that privacy.
are completely detrimental to privacy and control, because they do not have the security
necessary to enforce that privacy.
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bootloader_unlocking">Unlocked bootloaders</a>
prevent the device from
<a href="https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/verifiedboot/">verifying the integrity of the boot chain</a>,
including the OS, meaning any adversary, whether a stranger who
happens to pick up the device, or a big tech or government
entity, can simply inject malicious code into your software and
you wouldn't have any idea it was there. If that's not enough of
a backdoor for you to reconsider your position, how about the
trivial
including the OS, meaning any adversary, whether a stranger who happens to pick up the
device, or a big tech or government entity, can simply inject malicious code into your
software and you wouldn't have any idea it was there. If that's not enough of a backdoor
for you to reconsider your position, how about the trivial
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack">evil maid</a>
and data extraction attacks which could be executed on your
device, without coercion? With Android phones, this is bad
enough to completely break the privacy and control the FOSS
movement seeks, but "Linux phones" take it a step further by
implementing barely any security, if any at all.
and data extraction attacks which could be executed on your device, without coercion?
With Android phones, this is bad enough to completely break the privacy and control the
FOSS movement seeks, but "Linux phones" take it a step further by implementing barely
any security, if any at all.
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation">Privilege escalation</a>
is trivial to achieve on any Linux system, which is the reason
Linux
is trivial to achieve on any Linux system, which is the reason Linux
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardening_(computing)">hardening</a>
strategies often include restricting access to the root account;
if you
strategies often include restricting access to the root account; if you
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)">root your Android phone</a>,
or use a "Linux phone", you've already destroyed the security
model, and thus privacy and control model you were attempting to
achieve. Not only are these side effects of FOSS, so is the
absolutely illogical restriction of not being able to, or making
it unnecessarily difficult to, install and update critical
components of the system, such as proprietary
or use a "Linux phone", you've already destroyed the security model, and thus privacy
and control model you were attempting to achieve. Not only are these side effects of
FOSS, so is the absolutely illogical restriction of not being able to, or making it
unnecessarily difficult to, install and update critical components of the system, such
as proprietary
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firmware">firmware</a>,
which just so happens to be almost all of them. "Linux phones"
are not as free as they proclaim to be.</p>
which just so happens to be almost all of them. "Linux phones" are not as free as they
proclaim to be.</p>
<p>You may ask "What's so bad about using
<a href="https://lineageos.org/">LineageOS</a>?",
to which I answer with "What's not bad about it?".
to which I answer with "What's not bad about it?".</p>
<ul>
<li>LineageOS uses
<a href="https://github.com/LineageOS/hudson/blob/master/lineage-build-targets">debug builds</a>,
not safe and secure release builds.</li>
<li>LineageOS requires an unlocked bootloader.
Even when installed on devices which support
custom Android Verified Boot (AVB) keys, the
bootloader cannot be locked due to lack of the
OS being signed.</li>
<li>LineageOS does not install critically
important firmware without manual flashing,
requiring users to perform a second update to
install this firmware; this likely causes users
to ignore the notification or miss firmware
<li>LineageOS requires an unlocked bootloader. Even when installed on devices
which support custom Android Verified Boot (AVB) keys, the bootloader cannot be
locked due to lack of the OS being signed.</li>
<li>LineageOS does not install critically important firmware without manual
flashing, requiring users to perform a second update to install this firmware;
this likely causes users to ignore the notification or miss firmware
updates.</li>
<li>LineageOS does not implement
<a href="https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection">rollback protection</a>,
meaning any adversary, from a stranger who
physically picks up the device, to a goverment
entity remotely, can simply downgrade the OS to
a previous version in order to exploit known
meaning any adversary, from a stranger who physically picks up the device, to a
goverment entity remotely, can simply downgrade the OS to a previous version in
order to exploit known
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vulnerability_(computing)">security vulnerabilities</a>.</li>
</ul>
</p>
<p>LineageOS is not the only Android OS (commonly, and
incorrectly, referred to as a "ROM") with such issues, but it is
one of the worst. The only things such insecure OSes can provide
you are customisation abilities, and a backdoor to your data.
They are best suited as a development OS, not a production
OS.</p>
<p>LineageOS is not the only Android OS (commonly, and incorrectly, referred to as a
"ROM") with such issues, but it is one of the worst. The only things such insecure OSes
can provide you are customisation abilities, and a backdoor to your data. They are best
suited as a development OS, not a production OS.</p>
</section>
</section>
<section id="solution">
<h2><a href="#solution">Solution</a></h2>
<p>What can you do about this? The answer is simple; however, it does require
you to use logic, fact, and evidence, not emotion, which is a difficult pill for
most people to swallow. Use your adversaries' weapons against them. The only way
to effectively combat the privacy invasion and lack of control of our devices
and data is to become a
<p>What can you do about this? The answer is simple; however, it does require you to use logic,
fact, and evidence, not emotion, which is a difficult pill for most people to swallow. Use your
adversaries' weapons against them. The only way to effectively combat the privacy invasion and
lack of control of our devices and data is to become a
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turncoat">renegade</a>
and not take sides. Yes, that means not taking sides with the closed-source,
proprietary, big tech and government entities, but it also means not taking
sides with any FOSS entities. The only way to win this war is to take
<em>whatever</em> hardware and software you can, and use it tactically.</p>
<p>The best solution for device security, privacy, and control, is to use a
Google Pixel (currently, Pixel 5a or newer) running
and not take sides. Yes, that means not taking sides with the closed-source, proprietary, big
tech and government entities, but it also means not taking sides with any FOSS entities. The
only way to win this war is to take <em>whatever</em> hardware and software you can, and use it
tactically.</p>
<p>The best solution for device security, privacy, and control, is to use a Google Pixel
(currently, Pixel 5a or newer) running
<a href="https://grapheneos.org/">GrapheneOS</a>.
Google Pixel devices allow you complete bootloader freedom, including the
<a href="https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/avb/+/master/README.md#pixel-2-and-later">ability to lock the bootloader after flashing a custom OS</a>
(GrapheneOS includes a custom OS signing key to allow locking the bootloader and
enabling verified boot to prevent
(GrapheneOS includes a custom OS signing key to allow locking the bootloader and enabling
verified boot to prevent
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malware">malware</a>
persistence, evil maid attacks, and boot chain
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_corruption">corruption</a>),
<a href="https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705">long device support lifecycles</a>
(minimum 3 years for Pixel 5a, minimum 5 years for Pixel 6-series and 7-series,
and minimum 7 years for Pixel 8-series and newer), and
(minimum 3 years for Pixel 5a, minimum 5 years for Pixel 6-series and 7-series, and minimum 7
years for Pixel 8-series and newer), and
<a href="https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/pixel/">guaranteed monthly security updates</a>
for the entire support timeframe of the devices.</p>
</section>
<section id="conclusion">
<h2><a href="#conclusion">Conclusion</a></h2>
<p>Use what you can, and do what you can. By neglecting security, you are, even
if unintentionally, neglecting exactly what you are trying to gain; privacy and
control.</p>
<p>Use what you can, and do what you can. By neglecting security, you are, even if
unintentionally, neglecting exactly what you are trying to gain; privacy and control.</p>
</section>
<div class="sitemap-small"><a href="../sitemap.xhtml">Sitemap</a></div>
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<!-- Inferencium - Website - Blog - #1 -->
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developer doesn't care about your security at all.</p>
<section id="issue-0">
<h2><a href="#issue-0">Issue #0 - Against CVE Assignment</a></h2>
<blockquote>"You don't assign CVEs to every single random bugfix we do, do
you?"</blockquote>
<blockquote>"You don't assign CVEs to every single random bugfix we do, do you?"</blockquote>
<p>- Lennart Poettering, systemd lead developer</p>
<p><b>My thoughts:</b> Yes, if they're security-related.</p>
<p>Source:
@ -56,41 +55,38 @@
</section>
<section id="issue-1">
<h2><a href="#issue-1">Issue #1 - CVEs Are Not Useful</a></h2>
<blockquote>"Humpf, I am not convinced this is the right way to announce this.
We never did that, and half the CVEs aren't useful anyway, hence I am not sure
we should start with that now, because it is either inherently incomplete or
blesses the nonsensical part of the CVE circus which we really shouldn't
bless..."</blockquote>
<blockquote>"Humpf, I am not convinced this is the right way to announce this. We never did
that, and half the CVEs aren't useful anyway, hence I am not sure we should start with that now,
because it is either inherently incomplete or blesses the nonsensical part of the CVE circus
which we really shouldn't bless..."</blockquote>
<p>- Lennart Poettering, systemd lead developer</p>
<p><b>My thoughts:</b> CVEs are supposed to be for security, and a log of when they
were found and their severity, so yes, it <em>is</em> the correct way to
announce it. It seems as if over 95 security-concious people think the same.</p>
<p><b>My thoughts:</b> CVEs are supposed to be for security, and a log of when they were found
and their severity, so yes, it <em>is</em> the correct way to announce it. It seems as if over
95 security-concious people think the same.</p>
<p>Source:
<a href="https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/6225#issuecomment-311739869">systemd GitHub Issue 6225</a></p>
</section>
<section id="issue-2">
<h2><a href="#issue-2">Issue #2 - Security is a Circus</a></h2>
<blockquote>"I am not sure I buy enough into the security circus to do that
though for any minor issue..."</blockquote>
<blockquote>"I am not sure I buy enough into the security circus to do that though for any minor
issue..."</blockquote>
<p>- Lennart Poettering, systemd lead developer</p>
<p>Source:
<a href="https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/5144#issuecomment-276740654">systemd GitHub Issue 5144</a></p>
</section>
<section id="issue-3">
<h2><a href="#issue-3">Issue #3 - Blaming the User</a></h2>
<blockquote><p>"Yes, as you found out "0day" is not a valid username. I wonder
which tool permitted you to create it in the first place. Note that not
permitting numeric first characters is done on purpose: to avoid ambiguities
between numeric UID and textual user names.</p>
<p>systemd will validate all configuration data you drop at it, making it hard to
generate invalid configuration. Hence, yes, it's a feature that we don't permit
invalid user names, and I'd consider it a limitation of xinetd that it doesn't
refuse an invalid username.</p>
<p>So, yeah, I don't think there's anything to fix in systemd here. I understand
this is annoying, but still: the username is clearly not valid."</p></blockquote>
<blockquote><p>"Yes, as you found out "0day" is not a valid username. I wonder which tool
permitted you to create it in the first place. Note that not permitting numeric first characters
is done on purpose: to avoid ambiguities between numeric UID and textual user names.</p>
<p>systemd will validate all configuration data you drop at it, making it hard to generate
invalid configuration. Hence, yes, it's a feature that we don't permit invalid user names, and
I'd consider it a limitation of xinetd that it doesn't refuse an invalid username.</p>
<p>So, yeah, I don't think there's anything to fix in systemd here. I understand this is
annoying, but still: the username is clearly not valid."</p></blockquote>
<p>- Lennart Poettering, systemd lead developer</p>
<p><b>My thoughts:</b> systemd was the thing that allowed root access just because a
username started with a number, then Poettering blamed the user.</p>
<p><b>My thoughts:</b> systemd was the thing that allowed root access just because a username
started with a number, then Poettering blamed the user.</p>
<p>Source:
<a href="https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/6237#issuecomment-311900864">systemd GitHub Issue 6237</a></p>
</section>

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<!DOCTYPE html>
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</nav>
<section id="introduction">
<h2><a href="#introduction">Introduction</a></h2>
<p>It's no secret that I'm an advocate of Chromium and will use it for the
foreseeable future. It is a highly secure web browser which provides strong
protection against malicious wesbites and the code they run, and, while I am not
too interested in high performance, it is a very performant web browser, despite
its security features.</p>
<p>However, the intention of this blog post is not to promote Chromium for any
reason, but rather show an issue with it; an issue which is larger than may be
realised by web-surfing users. That issue is the large monopoly Chromium has in
the web browser market;
<p>It's no secret that I'm an advocate of Chromium and will use it for the foreseeable future.
It is a highly secure web browser which provides strong protection against malicious wesbites
and the code they run, and, while I am not too interested in high performance, it is a very
performant web browser, despite its security features.</p>
<p>However, the intention of this blog post is not to promote Chromium for any reason, but
rather show an issue with it; an issue which is larger than may be realised by web-surfing
users. That issue is the large monopoly Chromium has in the web browser market;
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Usage_share_of_web_browsers#Summary_tables">Chromium's market share is around 65%</a>,
making it the largest slice of the cake. The issue becomes even deeper and more
problematic when you realise that the second-place web browser, Safari, has only
an 18% market share.</p>
<p>The main issue with this type of monopoly is the large amounts of power and
influence it gives Chromium, which can lead to, and is leading to, excessive
authority of how the web should work, and the standards which are implemented,
which all other web browsers must comply with in order to have a fully working
web.</p>
making it the largest slice of the cake. The issue becomes even deeper and more problematic when
you realise that the second-place web browser, Safari, has only an 18% market share.</p>
<p>The main issue with this type of monopoly is the large amounts of power and influence it
gives Chromium, which can lead to, and is leading to, excessive authority of how the web should
work, and the standards which are implemented, which all other web browsers must comply with in
order to have a fully working web.</p>
</section>
<section id="solution">
<h2><a href="#solution">Solution</a></h2>
<p>In order to combat the Chromium monopoly, users typically go over to
Chromium's classical rival, Firefox. However, Firefox is dying and has lost
almost all of its userbase over the last 2-3 years; the reason for this is a
tale of selfishness and greed, caused by Firefox's parent company to go off
course and lose its original goal of providing a freedom-respecting, open web.
Mozilla caused self-inflicted damage which it cannot recover from, and, to me,
is already dead. The vultures are simply waiting for the final, small group of
users to abandon the project before Firefox finally succumbs to its own demise;
the demise it caused itself.</p>
<p>If attempting to increase Firefox's market share to previous levels will be
in vain, what is the solution? How can we prevent Chromium from completely
taking over the web and dictating everything we do and how the web should be
designed and used?</p>
<p>To find the answer to these important but difficult questions, we must go to
the alternatives which still have a fighting chance. Safari, developed by Apple,
is based on WebKit, an engine completely independent of Chromium and
Firefox.</p>
<p>Just using a non-Chromium-based web browser is not enough; the choice must
already have enough market share to still be relevant, and be capable of gaining
new users. Safari, being preinstalled on Apple devices including iPhone and Mac,
already has a great advantage over Firefox. Apple devices, especially iPhone, is
abundant in streets everywhere on the planet. Safari is the default choice for
Apple users and has a large market share simply because of how widespread it is.
Exploiting this fact is the only way to gain more market share and take down
Chromium before it is too late; the clock is ticking, and Apple are the only
ones preventing Chromium from completely taking over the web. Backing Safari
instead of Firefox will keep the WebKit market share from falling to a
critically low percentage, making it impossible to make a comeback, as has
happened to Firefox. Sometimes, directly supporting a political party is not the
way to get them into power, supporting the second-place alternative is, in order
to keep the one you don't want out of power, giving the party you do want in
power an advantage. To win this war against the Chromium monopoly, we must be
tactical, not emotional.</p>
<p>In order to combat the Chromium monopoly, users typically go over to Chromium's classical
rival, Firefox. However, Firefox is dying and has lost almost all of its userbase over the last
2-3 years; the reason for this is a tale of selfishness and greed, caused by Firefox's parent
company to go off course and lose its original goal of providing a freedom-respecting, open web.
Mozilla caused self-inflicted damage which it cannot recover from, and, to me, is already dead.
The vultures are simply waiting for the final, small group of users to abandon the project
before Firefox finally succumbs to its own demise; the demise it caused itself.</p>
<p>If attempting to increase Firefox's market share to previous levels will be in vain, what is
the solution? How can we prevent Chromium from completely taking over the web and dictating
everything we do and how the web should be designed and used?</p>
<p>To find the answer to these important but difficult questions, we must go to the alternatives
which still have a fighting chance. Safari, developed by Apple, is based on WebKit, an engine
completely independent of Chromium and Firefox.</p>
<p>Just using a non-Chromium-based web browser is not enough; the choice must already have
enough market share to still be relevant, and be capable of gaining new users. Safari, being
preinstalled on Apple devices including iPhone and Mac, already has a great advantage over
Firefox. Apple devices, especially iPhone, is abundant in streets everywhere on the planet.
Safari is the default choice for Apple users and has a large market share simply because of how
widespread it is. Exploiting this fact is the only way to gain more market share and take down
Chromium before it is too late; the clock is ticking, and Apple are the only ones preventing
Chromium from completely taking over the web. Backing Safari instead of Firefox will keep the
WebKit market share from falling to a critically low percentage, making it impossible to make a
comeback, as has happened to Firefox. Sometimes, directly supporting a political party is not
the way to get them into power, supporting the second-place alternative is, in order to keep the
one you don't want out of power, giving the party you do want in power an advantage. To win this
war against the Chromium monopoly, we must be tactical, not emotional.</p>
</section>
<section id="conclusion">
<h2><a href="#conclusion">Conclusion</a></h2>
<p>Supporting Safari is the first step in supporting WebKit and promoting usage
of the independent web engine. Buying time while supporting and contributing to
WebKit browser projects is the best and only chance anyone has at competing with
Chromium, and preventing it from increasing its dominance to unstoppable levels,
at which point there will be no return.</p>
<p>Supporting Safari is the first step in supporting WebKit and promoting usage of the
independent web engine. Buying time while supporting and contributing to WebKit browser projects
is the best and only chance anyone has at competing with Chromium, and preventing it from
increasing its dominance to unstoppable levels, at which point there will be no return.</p>
</section>
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<!DOCTYPE html>
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</nav>
<section id="introduction">
<h2><a href="#introduction">Introduction</a></h2>
<p>A recent trend is seeing people move towards decentralised services and
platforms. While this is reasonable and I can understand why they are doing such
a thing, they are seemingly doing it without thinking about the possible
consequences of doing so. The issue with decentralisation is trust; there is no
way to pin a key to a specific person, to ensure that you are communicating with
the same person you are supposed to be communicating with. In this article, I
will discuss some of the security issues with the decentralised model.</p>
<p>A recent trend is seeing people move towards decentralised services and platforms. While this
is reasonable and I can understand why they are doing such a thing, they are seemingly doing it
without thinking about the possible consequences of doing so. The issue with decentralisation is
trust; there is no way to pin a key to a specific person, to ensure that you are communicating
with the same person you are supposed to be communicating with. In this article, I will discuss
some of the security issues with the decentralised model.</p>
</section>
<section id="examples">
<h2><a href="#examples">Examples</a></h2>
<section id="examples-messaging">
<h3><a href="#examples-messaging">Messaging</a></h3>
<p>When it comes to messaging your contacts on a centralised
platform, such as Twitter or Facebook, the keys are pinned to
that user account, using the user's password as the method of
identification. This approach makes it impossible to log in as a
specific user without their password, should it be strong enough
to not be guessed, whether via personal guessing or exhaustive
search. The trust in this centralised model is the high security
these platforms have. It is extremely unlikely that anyone other
than a government would be able to access the accounts stored on
such platforms' servers, which makes the physical security
trusted. As for remote security, should a user's password be
compromised, it can typically be reset if the user can prove
they are the owner of the account via some form of
identification; this is where the trust issue of
<p>When it comes to messaging your contacts on a centralised platform, such as Twitter
or Facebook, the keys are pinned to that user account, using the user's password as the
method of identification. This approach makes it impossible to log in as a specific user
without their password, should it be strong enough to not be guessed, whether via
personal guessing or exhaustive search. The trust in this centralised model is the high
security these platforms have. It is extremely unlikely that anyone other than a
government would be able to access the accounts stored on such platforms' servers, which
makes the physical security trusted. As for remote security, should a user's password be
compromised, it can typically be reset if the user can prove they are the owner of the
account via some form of identification; this is where the trust issue of
decentralisation occurs.</p>
<p>In the decentralised model, keys are kept on the users'
devices, in their possession. While this soveriegnty is
welcomed, it introduces a critical flaw in the security of
communicating with anyone via a decentralised platform; should a
user's device be lost, stolen, or otherwise compromised, there
is no way to know it happened and what the new keys really are,
and if the same user generated those keys. There is no
centralised point where anyone can go to check if the
compromised user has updated their keys, which means there must
already have been at least one other secure channel in place
before the compromise occurred. Even if there was, the security
of endpoint devices, especially typical users, is much lower
than a well protected corporation's servers, making even those
secure channels questionable to trust. Should all secure
channels be compromised, there is literally no way to know if
the person you are communicating with is the real person or an
imposter; there is no root of trust. This point is fatal; game
over. The only way to establish trust again would be to
physically meet and exchange keys.</p>
<p>In the decentralised model, keys are kept on the users' devices, in their possession.
While this soveriegnty is welcomed, it introduces a critical flaw in the security of
communicating with anyone via a decentralised platform; should a user's device be lost,
stolen, or otherwise compromised, there is no way to know it happened and what the new
keys really are, and if the same user generated those keys. There is no centralised
point where anyone can go to check if the compromised user has updated their keys, which
means there must already have been at least one other secure channel in place before the
compromise occurred. Even if there was, the security of endpoint devices, especially
typical users, is much lower than a well protected corporation's servers, making even
those secure channels questionable to trust. Should all secure channels be compromised,
there is literally no way to know if the person you are communicating with is the real
person or an imposter; there is no root of trust. This point is fatal; game over. The
only way to establish trust again would be to physically meet and exchange keys.</p>
</section>
</section>
<section id="solution">
<h2><a href="#solution">Solution</a></h2>
<p>I'll cut to the chase; there isn't a definitive solution. The best way to
handle this situation is to design your threat model and think about your
reasoning for avoiding centralised platforms. Is it lack of trust of a specific
company? Is it the possibility of centralised platforms going offline? Only by
thinking logically and tactically can you solve both the issue of centralisation
and decentralisation. Often, one size fits all is never the correct approach,
<p>I'll cut to the chase; there isn't a definitive solution. The best way to handle this
situation is to design your threat model and think about your reasoning for avoiding centralised
platforms. Is it lack of trust of a specific company? Is it the possibility of centralised
platforms going offline? Only by thinking logically and tactically can you solve both the issue
of centralisation and decentralisation. Often, one size fits all is never the correct approach,
nor does it typically work.</p>
<p>In order to avoid the issue of loss of trust due to lack of root of trust,
all users' keys must be stored in a centralised location where all contacts are
able to go to in case of compromise or to periodically check the state of keys
and to see if they have changed. This centralised location requires some sort of
identification to ensure that the user changing their keys is really the same
person who initially signed up for the platform, using a trust-on-first-use
(TOFU) model, which isn't much different than what today's centralised platforms
are already doing; the only difference is who is controlling the location; trust
is still present and required.</p>
<p>In order to avoid the issue of loss of trust due to lack of root of trust, all users' keys
must be stored in a centralised location where all contacts are able to go to in case of
compromise or to periodically check the state of keys and to see if they have changed. This
centralised location requires some sort of identification to ensure that the user changing their
keys is really the same person who initially signed up for the platform, using a
trust-on-first-use (TOFU) model, which isn't much different than what today's centralised
platforms are already doing; the only difference is who is controlling the location; trust is
still present and required.</p>
<p>In order to have a root of trust, I have posted my keys to my website, which
is protected by multiple layers of security:
is protected by multiple layers of security:</p>
<ol>
<li>I have provided identification to my domain name registrar,
to ensure I can access the website I rightfully own, should it
be compromised, by providing identification to the domain name
registrar.</li>
<li>I have provided identification to my virtual private server
host, to ensure I can access the virtual private servers I
rightfully rent, should they be compromised, by providing
identification to the virtual private server host.</li>
<li>I have pinned my website to a globally trusted certificate
authority, Let's Encrypt, which is a trusted party to manage TLS
certificates and ensure ownership of the domain when connecting
to it.</li>
<li>I have enabled DNSSEC on my domain, so it is extremely
difficult to spoof my domain to make you believe you're
connecting to it when you're actually connecting to someone
<li>I have provided identification to my domain name registrar, to ensure I can access
the website I rightfully own, should it be compromised, by providing identification to
the domain name registrar.</li>
<li>I have provided identification to my virtual private server host, to ensure I can
access the virtual private servers I rightfully rent, should they be compromised, by
providing identification to the virtual private server host.</li>
<li>I have pinned my website to a globally trusted certificate authority, Let's Encrypt,
which is a trusted party to manage TLS certificates and ensure ownership of the domain
when connecting to it.</li>
<li>I have enabled DNSSEC on my domain, so it is extremely difficult to spoof my domain
to make you believe you're connecting to it when you're actually connecting to someone
else's.</li>
</ol>
</p>
<p>While not the most secure implementation of a root of trust, it is the most
secure implementation currently available to me. While the domain name registrar
or virtual private server host could tamper with my domain and data, they are
the most trustworthy parties available. In its current form, decentralisation
would make this impossible to implement in any form.</p>
<p>While not the most secure implementation of a root of trust, it is the most secure
implementation currently available to me. While the domain name registrar or virtual private
server host could tamper with my domain and data, they are the most trustworthy parties
available. In its current form, decentralisation would make this impossible to implement in any
form.</p>
</section>
<section id="conclusion">
<h2><a href="#conclusion">Conclusion</a></h2>
<p>Do not demand anonymity; demand privacy and control of your own data.
Complete anonymity makes it impossible to have a root of trust, and is typically
never necessary. It is possible for someone else to hold your keys, without them
taking control of them and dictating what you can and cannot do (X's
misinformation policy comes to mind). If a platform is not listening to your or
other people's concerns about how it is being run, show those platforms that you
will not stand for it, and move to a different one. This may not be ideal, but
it's not different to moving from one decentralised platform to another.
Centralisation is not what is evil, the people in control of the platforms are
what is potentially evil. Carefully, logically, and tactically, choose who to
trust. Decentralisation doesn't do much for trust when you must still trust the
operator of the decentralised platform, and are still subject to the possibly
draconian policies of that decentralised platform. If government is what you are
trying to avoid, there is no denying it is feasibly impossible to avoid it; a
government could always take down the decentralised platform, forcing you to
move to another, and they could also take down the centralised key storage site
mentioned earlier in this article. A government is not something you can so
easily avoid. Decentralisation does not solve the government issue. In order to
live a happy, fun, and fulfilled life, while protecting yourself against logical
<p>Do not demand anonymity; demand privacy and control of your own data. Complete anonymity
makes it impossible to have a root of trust, and is typically never necessary. It is possible
for someone else to hold your keys, without them taking control of them and dictating what you
can and cannot do (X's misinformation policy comes to mind). If a platform is not listening to
your or other people's concerns about how it is being run, show those platforms that you will
not stand for it, and move to a different one. This may not be ideal, but it's not different to
moving from one decentralised platform to another. Centralisation is not what is evil, the
people in control of the platforms are what is potentially evil. Carefully, logically, and
tactically, choose who to trust. Decentralisation doesn't do much for trust when you must still
trust the operator of the decentralised platform, and are still subject to the possibly
draconian policies of that decentralised platform. If government is what you are trying to
avoid, there is no denying it is feasibly impossible to avoid it; a government could always take
down the decentralised platform, forcing you to move to another, and they could also take down
the centralised key storage site mentioned earlier in this article. A government is not
something you can so easily avoid. Decentralisation does not solve the government issue. In
order to live a happy, fun, and fulfilled life, while protecting yourself against logical
threats, there are only two words you must live by: Threat model.</p>
</section>
<div class="sitemap-small"><a href="../sitemap">Sitemap</a></div>

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<!DOCTYPE html>
<!-- Inferencium - Website - Changelog -->
<!-- Version: 6.0.0 -->
<!-- Version: 6.0.1-alpha.1 -->
<!-- Copyright 2023 Jake Winters -->
<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause -->

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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<!DOCTYPE html>
<!-- Inferencium - Website - Changelog - Firmware - aa000-0 -->
<!-- Version: 5.0.0 -->
<!-- Version: 5.0.1-alpha.1 -->
<!-- Copyright 2023 Jake Winters -->
<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause -->
@ -106,8 +106,7 @@
<p>Changelog (since version 2.0.0.3):</p>
<ul>
<li>Update WHENCE</li>
<li>Update AMD GPU Navy Flounder DMCUB firmware to version
0.0.172.0</li>
<li>Update AMD GPU Navy Flounder DMCUB firmware to version 0.0.172.0</li>
</ul>
</article>
<article id="2.0.0.3">
@ -119,8 +118,7 @@
<p>Changelog (since version 1.0.0.2):</p>
<ul>
<li>Update readme</li>
<li>Switch AMD CPU microcode readme from plaintext formatting to
AsciiDoc formatting</li>
<li>Switch AMD CPU microcode readme from plaintext formatting to AsciiDoc formatting</li>
<li>Update AMD CPU microcode readme</li>
<li>Update WHENCE</li>
<li>Update AMD GPU Navy Flounder DMCUB firmware</li>

2
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<!DOCTYPE html>
<!-- Inferencium - Website - Changelog - Firmware - xa000-0 -->
<!-- Version: 5.0.0 -->
<!-- Version: 5.0.1-alpha.1 -->
<!-- Copyright 2023 Jake Winters -->
<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause -->

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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<!DOCTYPE html>
<!-- Inferencium - Website - Changelog - Firmware - xb000-0 -->
<!-- Version: 5.0.0 -->
<!-- Version: 5.0.1-alpha.1 -->
<!-- Copyright 2023 Jake Winters -->
<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause -->

36
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<!DOCTYPE html>
<!-- Inferencium - Website - Contact -->
<!-- Version: 10.1.0 -->
<!-- Version: 10.1.1-alpha.1 -->
<!-- Copyright 2022 Jake Winters -->
<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause -->
@ -46,46 +46,38 @@
<h2><a href="#e2ee">End-to-end Encrypted Contact Methods</a></h2>
<section id="e2ee-preferred">
<h3><a href="#e2ee-preferred">Preferred</a></h3>
<p>Whenever possible, use the following contact methods; they
allow verification to mitigate man-in-the-middle attacks, have
high security, and reasonable privacy.</p>
<p>Whenever possible, use the following contact methods; they allow verification to mitigate
man-in-the-middle attacks, have high security, and reasonable privacy.</p>
<p><strong>Use the
<a href="key.xhtml">keys</a>
for each contact method to verify my devices.</strong></p>
<p>Note: Verification does not verify a person, only their devices,
and can be defeated via coercion or other force.</p>
<p><img src="asset/img/logo/signal.png" class="logo-small" width="40" height="40" alt="Signal logo"/>Signal
<p>Note: Verification does not verify a person, only their devices, and can be defeated via
coercion or other force.</p>
<p><img src="asset/img/logo/signal.png" class="logo-small" width="40" height="40" alt="Signal logo"/>Signal</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://signal.me/#eu/rXOem_06yX9bsIXE2IM4wAqu6MdZKrEeepdhm28bo0M82s2UXo1GHrew2grpTIkJ">inference.01</a></li>
</ul>
</p>
<p><img src="asset/img/logo/xmpp.png" class="logo-small" width="40" height="40" alt="XMPP logo"/>XMPP
<p><img src="asset/img/logo/xmpp.png" class="logo-small" width="40" height="40" alt="XMPP logo"/>XMPP</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="xmpp://inference@inferencium.net">inference@inferencium.net</a> (Main) - (<a href="key.xhtml#xmpp-inferencium">Key</a>)</li>
</ul>
</p>
</section>
<!--
<section id="e2ee-metadatafree">
<h3><a href="#e2ee-metadatafree">Metadata-free</a></h3>
<p>If metadata leakage is an issue for you, you can use the
following contact methods.</p>
<p>These services do not have verification functionality and
will be treated as less secure; <strong>unless you really need
to use these services, use a preferred method
<p>If metadata leakage is an issue for you, you can use the following contact methods.</p>
<p>These services do not have verification functionality and will be treated as less secure;
<strong>unless you really need to use these services, use a preferred method
instead.</strong></p>
</section>
-->
</section>
<!--
<section id="nonprivate">
<h2><a href="#nonprivate" class="h2">Non-private Contact Methods</a></h2>
<p>The following contact methods do not utilise end-to-end encryption, or I do
not use such functionality; they are suitable for public contact only, including
directly and groups. Do not use these methods if confidentiality and/or privacy
is required.</p>
<p>The following contact methods do not utilise end-to-end encryption, or I do not use
such functionality; they are suitable for public contact only, including directly and
groups. Do not use these methods if confidentiality and/or privacy is required.</p>
</section>
-->
</section>
<div class="sitemap-small"><a href="sitemap.xhtml">Sitemap</a></div>
</body>
</html>

64
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<!DOCTYPE html>
<!-- Inferencium - Website - Directory -->
<!-- Version: 5.0.1 -->
<!-- Version: 5.0.2-alpha.1 -->
<!-- Copyright 2023 Jake Winters -->
<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause -->
@ -33,15 +33,14 @@
<h1>Directory</h1>
<section id="xmpp">
<h2><a href="#xmpp">XMPP</a></h2>
<p>This is a list of XMPP channels hosted by me. Channels branded as
Inferencium are run by me. Channels not under Inferencium branding are
either run by me or other people, but are hosted on Inferencium servers.</p>
<p>Public channels can be joined by anyone without an invitation. Non-public
channels require an invitation; requirements for invitations differ
per channel.</p>
<p>For assistance within any channel, contact a moderator of the channel. If an
issue is related to a moderator, contact an administrator; administrators should
not be contacted unless the issue cannot be resolved by a moderator.</p>
<p>This is a list of XMPP channels hosted by me. Channels branded as Inferencium are run by me.
Channels not under Inferencium branding are either run by me or other people, but are hosted on
Inferencium servers.</p>
<p>Public channels can be joined by anyone without an invitation. Non-public channels require an
invitation; requirements for invitations differ per channel.</p>
<p>For assistance within any channel, contact a moderator of the channel. If an issue is related to
a moderator, contact an administrator; administrators should not be contacted unless the issue
cannot be resolved by a moderator.</p>
<div style="overflow-x: auto;">
<table class="lrg">
<colgroup>
@ -65,14 +64,10 @@
<th id="inf"><a href="xmpp://gojayi@muc.xmpp.inferencium.net?join">Inferencium</a></th>
<td class="desc" headers="description inf">
<p>Inferencium general channel.</p>
<p><b>Topic:</b> Any, excluding
NSFW.</p>
<p>Multimedia prohibited unless
part of discussion.</p>
</td>
<td class="red" headers="public inf">
No
<p><b>Topic:</b> Any, excluding NSFW.</p>
<p>Multimedia prohibited unless part of discussion.</p>
</td>
<td class="red" headers="public inf">No</td>
<td class="desc" headers="moderator inf">
<ul>
<li><a href="xmpp://homejacob@inferencium.net">homejacob@inferencium.net</a></li>
@ -89,13 +84,10 @@
<th id="inf-moderation"><a href="xmpp://moderation@muc.xmpp.inferencium.net?join">Inferencium - Moderation</a></th>
<td class="desc" headers="description inf-moderation">
<p>Inferencium moderation channel.</p>
<p><b>Topic:</b> Moderation of all XMPP
channels hosted by Inferencium.</p>
<p><b>Topic:</b> Moderation of all XMPP channels hosted by Inferencium.</p>
<p>Inferencium moderators only.</p>
</td>
<td class="red" headers="public inf-moderation">
No
</td>
<td class="red" headers="public inf-moderation">No</td>
<td class="desc" headers="moderator inf-moderation">
<ul>
<li><a href="xmpp://homejacob@inferencium.net">homejacob@inferencium.net</a></li>
@ -112,10 +104,8 @@
<th id="inf-multimedia"><a href="xmpp://multimedia@muc.xmpp.inferencium.net?join">Inferencium - Multimedia</a></th>
<td class="desc" headers="description inf-multimedia">
<p>Inferencium multimedia channel.</p>
<p><b>Topic:</b> Any, excluding
NSFW.</p>
<p>Discussion prohibited outside of
multimedia discussion.</p>
<p><b>Topic:</b> Any, excluding NSFW.</p>
<p>Discussion prohibited outside of multimedia discussion.</p>
</td>
<td class="red" headers="public inf-multimedia">
No
@ -135,14 +125,11 @@
<tr>
<th id="sys-hardening"><a href="xmpp://sys-hardening@muc.xmpp.inferencium.net?join">Systems Hardening</a></th>
<td class="desc" headers="description sys-hardening">
<p>Systems Hardening security and
privacy channel.</p>
<p><b>Topic:</b> General security
and privacy.</p>
</td>
<td class="green" headers="public sys-hardening">
Yes (Temporarily unavailable)
<p>Systems Hardening security and privacy channel.</p>
<p><b>Topic:</b> General security and privacy.</p>
</td>
<td class="green" headers="public sys-hardening">Yes
(Temporarily unavailable)</td>
<td class="desc" headers="moderator sys-hardening">
<ul>
<li><a href="xmpp://homejacob@inferencium.net">homejacob@inferencium.net</a></li>
@ -158,14 +145,11 @@
<tr>
<th id="sys-hardening-ot"><a href="xmpp://sys-hardening-ot@muc.xmpp.inferencium.net?join">Systems Hardening - Off-topic</a></th>
<td class="desc" headers="description sys-hardening-ot">
<p>Systems Hardening off-topic
channel.</p>
<p><b>Topic:</b> Any, excluding NSFW,
security, and privacy.</p>
</td>
<td class="green" headers="public sys-hardening-ot">
Yes (Temporarily unavailable)
<p>Systems Hardening off-topic channel.</p>
<p><b>Topic:</b> Any, excluding NSFW, security, and privacy.</p>
</td>
<td class="green" headers="public sys-hardening-ot">Yes
(Temporarily unavailable)</td>
<td class="desc" headers="moderator sys-hardening-ot">
<ul>
<li><a href="xmpp://homejacob@inferencium.net">homejacob@inferencium.net</a></li>

2
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<!DOCTYPE html>
<!-- Inferencium - Website - Documentation -->
<!-- Version: 5.0.0 -->
<!-- Version: 5.0.1-alpha.1 -->
<!-- Copyright 2023 Jake Winters -->
<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause -->

62
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<!DOCTYPE html>
<!-- Inferencium - Website - Documentation - hardened_malloc -->
<!-- Version: 5.0.0 -->
<!-- Version: 5.0.1-alpha.1 -->
<!-- Copyright 2023 Jake Winters -->
<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause -->
@ -34,14 +34,12 @@
<section id="introduction">
<p>This documentation contains instructions to use
<a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc">hardened_malloc</a>
memory allocator as the system's default memory allocator. These instructions
apply to both musl and glibc C libraries on Unix-based and Unix-like
systems.</p>
<p>hardened_malloc can also be used per-application and/or per-user, in which
case root permissions are not required; this documentation focuses on
system-wide usage of hardened_malloc, assumes root privileges, and assumes the
compiled library will be located in a path readable and executable by all users
of the system.</p>
memory allocator as the system's default memory allocator. These instructions apply to both musl and
glibc C libraries on Unix-based and Unix-like systems.</p>
<p>hardened_malloc can also be used per-application and/or per-user, in which case root permissions are
not required; this documentation focuses on system-wide usage of hardened_malloc, assumes root
privileges, and assumes the compiled library will be located in a path readable and executable by all
users of the system.</p>
<p>For the complete hardened_malloc documentation, visit its
<a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc#hardened_malloc">official documentation</a>.</p>
<p>This documentation is also available in portable AsciiDoc format in my
@ -60,9 +58,8 @@
</nav>
<section id="memory_pages">
<h2><a href="#memory_pages">Increase Permitted Amount of Memory Pages</a></h2>
<p>Add <code>vm.max_map_count = 1048576</code> to
<code>/etc/sysctl.conf</code> to accommodate hardened_malloc's large amount of
guard pages.</p>
<p>Add <code>vm.max_map_count = 1048576</code> to <code>/etc/sysctl.conf</code> to accommodate
hardened_malloc's large amount of guard pages.</p>
</section>
<section id="clone_source_code">
<h2><a href="#clone_source_code">Clone hardened_malloc Source Code</a></h2>
@ -75,13 +72,12 @@
<section id="compile">
<h2><a href="#compile">Compile hardened_malloc</a></h2>
<p><code>$ make <var>&lt;arguments&gt;</var></code></p>
<p><code>CONFIG_N_ARENA=<var>n</var></code> can be adjusted to increase parallel
performance at the expense of memory usage, or decrease memory usage at the
expense of parallel performance, where <code><var>n</var></code> is a
non-negative integer. Higher values prefer parallel performance, whereas lower
values prefer lower memory usage. Note that having too many arenas may cause
memory fragmentation and decrease system performance. The number of arenas has
no impact on the security properties of hardened_malloc.</p>
<p><code>CONFIG_N_ARENA=<var>n</var></code> can be adjusted to increase parallel performance at the
expense of memory usage, or decrease memory usage at the expense of parallel performance, where
<code><var>n</var></code> is a non-negative integer. Higher values prefer parallel performance,
whereas lower values prefer lower memory usage. Note that having too many arenas may cause memory
fragmentation and decrease system performance. The number of arenas has no impact on the security
properties of hardened_malloc.</p>
<table align="center">
<thead>
<tr>
@ -98,19 +94,17 @@
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>For extra security, <code>CONFIG_SEAL_METADATA=true</code> can be used in
order to control whether
<p>For extra security, <code>CONFIG_SEAL_METADATA=true</code> can be used in order to control
whether
<a href="https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v6.7/core-api/protection-keys.html">Memory Protection Keys</a>
are used to disable access to all writable allocator state outside of the memory
allocator code. It's currently disabled by default due to a significant
performance cost for this use case on current-generation hardware. Whether or
not this feature is enabled, the metadata is all contained within an isolated
memory region with high-entropy random guard regions around it.</p>
<p>For low-memory systems, <code>VARIANT=light</code> can be used to compile the
light variant of hardened_malloc, which sacrifices some security for much less
memory usage. This option still produces a more hardened memory allocator than
both the default musl and glibc allocators, despite the security sacrifices over
the full variant.</p>
are used to disable access to all writable allocator state outside of the memory allocator code.
It's currently disabled by default due to a significant performance cost for this use case on
current-generation hardware. Whether or not this feature is enabled, the metadata is all contained
within an isolated memory region with high-entropy random guard regions around it.</p>
<p>For low-memory systems, <code>VARIANT=light</code> can be used to compile the light variant of
hardened_malloc, which sacrifices some security for much less memory usage. This option still
produces a more hardened memory allocator than both the default musl and glibc allocators, despite
the security sacrifices over the full variant.</p>
<p>For all compile-time options, see the
<a href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc#configuration">configuration section</a>
of hardened_malloc's extensive official documentation.</p>
@ -121,11 +115,9 @@
</section>
<section id="preload_on_boot">
<h2><a href="#preload_on_boot">Set System to Preload hardened_malloc on Boot</a></h2>
<p><b>musl-based systems:</b> Add
<code>LD_PRELOAD=<var>&lt;hardened_malloc path&gt;</var></code> to
<p><b>musl-based systems:</b> Add <code>LD_PRELOAD=<var>&lt;hardened_malloc path&gt;</var></code> to
<code>/etc/environment</code></p>
<p><b>glibc-based systems:</b> Add
<code><var>&lt;hardened_malloc path&gt;</var></code> to
<p><b>glibc-based systems:</b> Add <code><var>&lt;hardened_malloc path&gt;</var></code> to
<code>/etc/ld.so.preload</code></p>
</section>
<div class="sitemap-small"><a href="../sitemap.xhtml">Sitemap</a></div>

59
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<!DOCTYPE html>
<!-- Inferencium - Website - Documentation - OpenSSL Self-signed Certificate Chain -->
<!-- Version: 5.0.0 -->
<!-- Version: 5.0.1-alpha.1 -->
<!-- Copyright 2023 Jake Winters -->
<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause -->
@ -32,13 +32,12 @@
</nav>
<h1 id="openssl_selfsigned_certificate_chain"><a href="#openssl_selfsigned_certificate_chain">Documentation - OpenSSL Self-signed Certificate Chain</a></h1>
<section id="introduction">
<p>This documentation contains the complete set of commands to create a new OpenSSL
self-signed certificate chain with V3 subjectAltName (SAN) extensions enabled. Multiple
SANs can be included in a certificate by adding each domain as a comma-delimited string.
Each key can be encrypted or unencrypted, with multiple encryption options; AES
(<code>aes128</code> or <code>aes256</code>) is recommended. Optional verification can
also be performed between multiple levels of certificates to ensure the chain of trust
is valid.</p>
<p>This documentation contains the complete set of commands to create a new OpenSSL self-signed
certificate chain with V3 subjectAltName (SAN) extensions enabled. Multiple SANs can be included in a
certificate by adding each domain as a comma-delimited string. Each key can be encrypted or unencrypted,
with multiple encryption options; AES (<code>aes128</code> or <code>aes256</code>) is recommended.
Optional verification can also be performed between multiple levels of certificates to ensure the chain
of trust is valid.</p>
<p>This documentation is also available in portable AsciiDoc format in my
<a href="https://src.inferencium.net/Inferencium/doc/src/branch/stable/security/openssl_selfsigned_certificate_chain.adoc">documentation source code repository</a>.</p>
</section>
@ -66,7 +65,8 @@
</nav>
<section id="create_certificate_authority_key">
<h2><a href="#create_certificate_authority_key">Create Certificate Authority Key</a></h2>
<p><code>openssl genrsa <var>&lt;encryption type&gt;</var> -out <var>&lt;CA key name&gt;</var>.pem <var>&lt;key size&gt;</var></code></p>
<p><code>openssl genrsa <var>&lt;encryption type&gt;</var> -out <var>&lt;CA key name&gt;</var>.pem
<var>&lt;key size&gt;</var></code></p>
</section>
<section id="verify_certificate_authority_key">
<h2><a href="#verify_certificate_authority_key">Verify Certificate Authority Key</a></h2>
@ -74,11 +74,13 @@
</section>
<section id="create_certificate_authority_certificate">
<h2><a href="#create_certificate_authority_certificate">Create Certificate Authority Certificate</a></h2>
<p><code>openssl req -new -x509 -days <var>&lt;days of validity&gt;</var> -extensions v3_ca -key <var>&lt;CA key name&gt;</var>.pem -out <var>&lt;CA certificate name&gt;</var>.pem</code></p>
<p><code>openssl req -new -x509 -days <var>&lt;days of validity&gt;</var> -extensions v3_ca -key
<var>&lt;CA key name&gt;</var>.pem -out <var>&lt;CA certificate name&gt;</var>.pem</code></p>
</section>
<section id="convert_certificate_to_pem_format">
<h2><a href="#convert_certificate_to_pem_format">Convert Certificate to PEM Format</a></h2>
<p><code>openssl x509 -in <var>&lt;CA certificate name&gt;</var>.pem -out <var>&lt;CA certificate name&gt;</var>.pem -outform PEM</code></p>
<p><code>openssl x509 -in <var>&lt;CA certificate name&gt;</var>.pem -out
<var>&lt;CA certificate name&gt;</var>.pem -outform PEM</code></p>
</section>
<section id="verify_certificate_authority_certificate">
<h2><a href="#verify_certificate_authority_certificate">Verify Certificate Authority Certificate</a></h2>
@ -86,7 +88,8 @@
</section>
<section id="create_intermediate_certificate_authority_key">
<h2><a href="#create_intermediate_certificate_authority_key">Create Intermediate Certificate Authority Key</a></h2>
<p><code>openssl genrsa <var>&lt;encryption type&gt;</var> -out <var>&lt;intermediate CA key name&gt;</var>.pem <var>&lt;key size&gt;</var></code></p>
<p><code>openssl genrsa <var>&lt;encryption type&gt;</var> -out
<var>&lt;intermediate CA key name&gt;</var>.pem <var>&lt;key size&gt;</var></code></p>
</section>
<section id="verify_intermediate_certificate_authority_key">
<h2><a href="#verify_intermediate_certificate_authority_key">Verify Intermediate Certificate Authority Key</a></h2>
@ -94,23 +97,30 @@
</section>
<section id="create_intermediate_certificate_authority_signing_request">
<h2><a href="#create_intermediate_certificate_authority_signing_request">Create Intermediate Certificate Authority Signing Request</a></h2>
<p><code>openssl req -new -sha256 -key <var>&lt;intermediate CA key name&gt;</var>.pem -out <var>&lt;intermediate CA certificate signing request name&gt;</var>.pem</code></p>
<p><code>openssl req -new -sha256 -key <var>&lt;intermediate CA key name&gt;</var>.pem -out
<var>&lt;intermediate CA certificate signing request name&gt;</var>.pem</code></p>
</section>
<section id="create_intermediate_certificate_authority_certificate">
<h2><a href="#create_intermediate_certificate_authority_certificate">Create Intermediate Certificate Authority Certificate</a></h2>
<p><code>openssl ca -config <var>&lt;intermediate CA configuration file&gt;</var> -extensions v3_intermediate_ca -days <var>&lt;days of validity&gt;</var> -notext -md sha256 -in <var>&lt;intermediate CA signing request name&gt;</var>.pem -out <var>&lt;intermediate CA certificate name&gt;</var>.pem</code></p>
<p><code>openssl ca -config <var>&lt;intermediate CA configuration file&gt;</var> -extensions
v3_intermediate_ca -days <var>&lt;days of validity&gt;</var> -notext -md sha256 -in
<var>&lt;intermediate CA signing request name&gt;</var>.pem -out
<var>&lt;intermediate CA certificate name&gt;</var>.pem</code></p>
</section>
<section id="verify_intermediate_certificate_authority_certificate">
<h2><a href="#verify_intermediate_certificate_authority_certificate">Verify Intermediate Certificate Authority Certificate</a></h2>
<p><code>openssl x509 -noout -text -in <var>&lt;intermediate CA certificate name&gt;</var>.pem</code></p>
<p><code>openssl x509 -noout -text -in
<var>&lt;intermediate CA certificate name&gt;</var>.pem</code></p>
</section>
<section id="verify_chain_of_trust-ca_to_intermediate">
<h2><a href="#verify_chain_of_trust-ca_to_intermediate">Verify Chain of Trust (CA to Intermediate)</a></h2>
<p><code>openssl verify -CAfile <var>&lt;CA certificate name&gt;</var>.pem <var>&lt;intermediate CA certificate name&gt;</var>.pem</code></p>
<p><code>openssl verify -CAfile <var>&lt;CA certificate name&gt;</var>.pem
<var>&lt;intermediate CA certificate name&gt;</var>.pem</code></p>
</section>
<section id="create_server_key">
<h2><a href="#create_server_key">Create Server Key</a></h2>
<p><code>openssl genrsa <var>&lt;encryption type&gt;</var> -out <var>&lt;server key name&gt;</var>.pem <var>&lt;key size&gt;</var></code></p>
<p><code>openssl genrsa <var>&lt;encryption type&gt;</var> -out
<var>&lt;server key name&gt;</var>.pem <var>&lt;key size&gt;</var></code></p>
</section>
<section id="verify_server_key">
<h2><a href="#verify_server_key">Verify Server Key</a></h2>
@ -118,11 +128,19 @@
</section>
<section id="create_server_certificate_signing_request">
<h2><a href="#create_server_certificate_signing_request">Create Server Certificate Signing Request</a></h2>
<p><code>openssl req -new -sha256 -subj "/C=<var>&lt;country&gt;</var>/ST=<var>&lt;state/province&gt;</var>/L=<var>&lt;locality&gt;</var>/O=<var>&lt;organization&gt;</var>/CN=<var>&lt;common name&gt;</var>" -addext "subjectAltName = DNS.1:<var>&lt;alternative DNS entry&gt;</var>" -key <var>&lt;server key name&gt;</var>.pem -out <var>&lt;server certificate signing request name&gt;</var>.pem</code></p>
<p><code>openssl req -new -sha256 -subj "/C=<var>&lt;country&gt;</var>/ST=<var>&lt;state/province&gt;</var>/L=<var>&lt;locality&gt;</var>/O=<var>&lt;organization&gt;</var>/CN=<var>&lt;common name&gt;</var>"
-addext "subjectAltName = DNS.1:<var>&lt;alternative DNS entry&gt;</var>" -key
<var>&lt;server key name&gt;</var>.pem -out
<var>&lt;server certificate signing request name&gt;</var>.pem</code></p>
</section>
<section id="create_server_certificate">
<h2><a href="#create_server_certificate">Create Server Certificate</a></h2>
<p><code>openssl x509 -sha256 -req -days <var>&lt;days of validity&gt;</var> -in <var>&lt;server certificate signing request name&gt;</var>.pem -CA <var>&lt;intermediate CA certificate name&gt;</var>.pem -CAkey <var>&lt;intermediate CA key name&gt;</var>.pem -extensions SAN -extfile &lt;(cat /etc/ssl/openssl.cnf &lt;(printf "\n[SAN]\nsubjectAltName=DNS.1:")) -out <var>&lt;server certificate name&gt;</var>.pem</code></p>
<p><code>openssl x509 -sha256 -req -days <var>&lt;days of validity&gt;</var> -in
<var>&lt;server certificate signing request name&gt;</var>.pem -CA
<var>&lt;intermediate CA certificate name&gt;</var>.pem -CAkey
<var>&lt;intermediate CA key name&gt;</var>.pem -extensions SAN -extfile &lt;(cat
/etc/ssl/openssl.cnf &lt;(printf "\n[SAN]\nsubjectAltName=DNS.1:")) -out
<var>&lt;server certificate name&gt;</var>.pem</code></p>
</section>
<section id="verify_server_certificate">
<h2><a href="#verify_server_certificate">Verify Server Certificate</a></h2>
@ -130,7 +148,8 @@
</section>
<section id="verify_chain_of_trust-intermediate_to_server">
<h2><a href="#verify_chain_of_trust-intermediate_to_server">Verify Chain of Trust (Intermediate to Server)</a></h2>
<p><code>openssl verify -CAfile <var>&lt;intermediate CA certificate name&gt;</var>.pem <var>&lt;server certificate&gt;</var>.pem</code></p>
<p><code>openssl verify -CAfile <var>&lt;intermediate CA certificate name&gt;</var>.pem
<var>&lt;server certificate&gt;</var>.pem</code></p>
</section>
<div class="sitemap-small"><a href="../sitemap.xhtml">Sitemap</a></div>
</body>

2
index.xhtml
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<!DOCTYPE html>
<!-- Inferencium - Website - Index -->
<!-- Version: 7.0.0 -->
<!-- Version: 7.0.1-alpha.1 -->
<!-- Copyright 2022 Jake Winters -->
<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause -->

34
key.xhtml
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<!DOCTYPE html>
<!-- Inferencium - Website - Key -->
<!-- Version: 9.0.0 -->
<!-- Version: 9.0.1-alpha.1 -->
<!-- Copyright 2022 Jake Winters -->
<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause -->
@ -76,8 +76,8 @@
and
<a href="https://codeberg.org/inference/key">Codeberg</a>
in order to check for discrepancies between the keys</li>
<li>Verification does not verify a person, only their devices, and can
be defeated via coercion or other force</li>
<li>Verification does not verify a person, only their devices, and can be defeated via coercion
or other force</li>
</ul>
</section>
<section id="e2ee">
@ -91,15 +91,11 @@
<h4 id="xmpp-inferencium"><a href="#xmpp-inferencium">inference@inferencium.net (Main)</a></h4>
<h5 id="xmpp-inferencium-current"><a href="#xmpp-inferencium-current">Current</a></h5>
<h6 id="xmpp-inferencium-current-1"><a href="#xmpp-inferencium-current-1">#1</a></h6>
<code>
67ee49da 37bcc392 691d9151 851e4240 6b5e80c2 e7d060b5 78dfdb41 443f9c52
</code>
<code>67ee49da 37bcc392 691d9151 851e4240 6b5e80c2 e7d060b5 78dfdb41 443f9c52</code>
<p><a href="xmpp:inference@inferencium.net?omemo-sid-1641576775=67ee49da37bcc392691d9151851e42406b5e80c2e7d060b578dfdb41443f9c52">xmpp:inference@inferencium.net?omemo-sid-1641576775=67ee49da37bcc392691d9151851e42406b5e80c2e7d060b578dfdb41443f9c52</a></p>
<h5 id="xmpp-inferencium-legacy"><a href="#xmpp-inferencium-legacy">Legacy</a></h5>
<h6 id="xmpp-inferencium-legacy-0"><a href="#xmpp-inferencium-legacy-0">#0</a></h6>
<code>
1bd03c6a 5e011655 2fafd697 da4fce70 63de5a83 a264a34a fcce78fe 6b06820c
</code>
<code>1bd03c6a 5e011655 2fafd697 da4fce70 63de5a83 a264a34a fcce78fe 6b06820c</code>
<p><a href="xmpp:inference@inferencium.net?omemo-sid-1586888206=1bd03c6a5e0116552fafd697da4fce7063de5a83a264a34afcce78fe6b06820c">xmpp:inference@inferencium.net?omemo-sid-1586888206=1bd03c6a5e0116552fafd697da4fce7063de5a83a264a34afcce78fe6b06820c</a></p>
</section>
</section>
@ -108,28 +104,20 @@
<section id="ssh">
<h3><a href="#ssh">SSH</a></h3>
<p class="update_date">Updated: 2023-07-27 (UTC+00:00)</p>
<p>Each SSH key is signed by the previous key, allowing verification of
the chain of keys, and root of trust.</p>
<p>Each SSH key is signed by the previous key, allowing verification of the chain of keys,
and root of trust.</p>
<h4 id="ssh-current"><a href="ssh-current">Current</a></h4>
<h5 id="ssh-current-1"><a href="#ssh-current-1">#1 (2023-07-27 - present)</a></h5>
<h6 id="ssh-current-1-fingerprint"><a href="#ssh-current-1-fingerprint">Fingerprint</a></h6>
<code>
SHA256:FtEVfx1CmTKMy40VwZvF4k+3TC+QhCWy+EmPRg50Nnc
</code>
<code>SHA256:FtEVfx1CmTKMy40VwZvF4k+3TC+QhCWy+EmPRg50Nnc</code>
<h6 id="ssh-current-1-key"><a href="#ssh-current-1-key">Key</a></h6>
<code>
ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAILHPGnrIg7dI7GUqA+lTztJSrn+7QyRceajqs4iaU8UG
</code>
<code>ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAILHPGnrIg7dI7GUqA+lTztJSrn+7QyRceajqs4iaU8UG</code>
<h4 id="ssh-legacy"><a href="#ssh-legacy">Legacy</a></h4>
<h5 id="ssh-legacy-0"><a href="#ssh-legacy-0">#0 (2023-01-01 - 2023-07-27)</a></h5>
<h6 id="ssh-legacy-0-fingerprint"><a href="#ssh-legacy-0-fingerprint">Fingerprint</a></h6>
<code>
SHA256:9Pl0nZ2UJacgm+IeEtLSZ4FOESgP1eKCtRflfPfdX9M
</code>
<code>SHA256:9Pl0nZ2UJacgm+IeEtLSZ4FOESgP1eKCtRflfPfdX9M</code>
<h6 id="ssh-legacy-0-key"><a href="#ssh-legacy-0-key">Key</a></h6>
<code>
ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAINs8UH2hVmNSg0qKig/9ZQt07IuOHsorRfw1doEgMuJ8
</code>
<code>ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAINs8UH2hVmNSg0qKig/9ZQt07IuOHsorRfw1doEgMuJ8</code>
</section>
</section>
<div class="sitemap-small"><a href="sitemap.xhtml">Sitemap</a></div>

14
main.css
View File

@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
/* Inferencium - Website - CSS - Main */
/* Version: 12.0.1 */
/* Version: 12.0.2-alpha.1 */
/* Copyright 2022 Jake Winters */
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause */
/* Display Size - Large
Colour Scheme - Dark */
/* Body */
body {
padding-top: 40px;
@ -19,7 +21,8 @@ body {
/* Headings */
h1, h1 a, h1 a:visited, h2, h2 a, h2 a:visited, h3, h3 a, h3 a:visited, h4, h4 a, h4 a:visited, h5, h5 a, h5 a:visited, h6, h6 a, h6 a:visited {
h1, h1 a, h1 a:visited, h2, h2 a, h2 a:visited, h3, h3 a, h3 a:visited, h4, h4 a, h4 a:visited, h5, h5 a, h5 a:visited,
h6, h6 a, h6 a:visited {
text-align: left;
line-height: 130%;
color: #ffffff;
@ -205,13 +208,12 @@ nav.navbar div.sitemap a, nav.navbar div.sitemap a:visited {
font-size: 14px;
}
div.sitemap-small {
display: none;
}
/* Media */
/* Display Size - Small */
@media (max-width: 600px) {
body {
@ -285,6 +287,7 @@ div.sitemap-small {
}
/* Colour Scheme - Light */
@media (prefers-color-scheme: light) {
body {
@ -292,7 +295,8 @@ div.sitemap-small {
color: #000000;
}
h1, h1 a, h1 a:visited, h2, h2 a, h2 a:visited, h3, h3 a, h3 a:visited, h4, h4 a, h4 a:visited, h5, h5 a, h5 a:visited, h6, h6 a, h6 a:visited, code {
h1, h1 a, h1 a:visited, h2, h2 a, h2 a:visited, h3, h3 a, h3 a:visited, h4, h4 a, h4 a:visited, h5, h5 a,
h5 a:visited, h6, h6 a, h6 a:visited, code {
color: #000000;
}

17
music.xhtml
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<!DOCTYPE html>
<!-- Inferencium - Website - Music -->
<!-- Version: 7.0.0 -->
<!-- Version: 7.0.1-alpha.1 -->
<!-- Copyright 2023 Jake Winters -->
<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause -->
@ -32,15 +32,12 @@
</nav>
<h1 id="music"><a href="#music">Music</a></h1>
<section id="music_list">
<p>This is a curated list of my personally-enjoyed music. The list
is alphabetically-sorted A-Z, based on artist name, followed by
track name, and is formatted as
<code><var>ARTIST</var> - <var>TRACK</var></code>. Each item in the
list has its own individual link which will take you to an official
source of the item (or the best alternative when an official source
is unavailable). It is your responsibility to comply with any local
laws when following these links and/or consuming any media found in
this list.</p>
<p>This is a curated list of my personally-enjoyed music. The list is alphabetically-sorted A-Z, based
on artist name, followed by track name, and is formatted as <code><var>ARTIST</var> -
<var>TRACK</var></code>. Each item in the list has its own individual link which will take you to an
official source of the item (or the best alternative when an official source is unavailable). It is your
responsibility to comply with any local laws when following these links and/or consuming any media found
in this list.</p>
<ul>
<li><a href="https://youtube.com/watch?v=_Eq_qQUPvGQ">Altare - Impulse</a></li>
<li><a href="https://youtube.com/watch?v=mXWhf35hOXA">Anomy5 - Predator</a></li>

12
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<!DOCTYPE html>
<!-- Inferencium - Website - News -->
<!-- Version: 1.0.0 -->
<!-- Version: 1.0.1-alpha.1 -->
<!-- Copyright 2024 Jake Winters -->
<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause -->
@ -47,12 +47,10 @@
<p><a href="https://src.inferencium.net/Inferencium">Inferencium source code repositories</a>
are now mirrored at
<a href="https://codeberg.org/Inferencium">Codeberg</a>.
In case of service disruption of the main Inferencium source
code repositories, the mirrors can be used to access the source
code.</p>
<p>Due to terms of service restrictions, proprietary code and
related repositories, such as firmware, are unable to be
mirrored to Codeberg.</p>
In case of service disruption of the main Inferencium source code repositories, the mirrors
can be used to access the source code.</p>
<p>Due to terms of service restrictions, proprietary code and related repositories, such as
firmware, are unable to be mirrored to Codeberg.</p>
</article>
</section>
<div class="sitemap-small"><a href="sitemap.xhtml">Sitemap</a></div>

2
sitemap.xhtml
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<!DOCTYPE html>
<!-- Inferencium - Website - Sitemap (HTML) -->
<!-- Version: 1.0.0 -->
<!-- Version: 1.0.1-alpha.1 -->
<!-- Copyright 2024 Jake Winters -->
<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause -->

5
sitemap.xml
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@ -1,14 +1,13 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!-- Inferencium - Website - Sitemap (XML) -->
<!-- Version: 1.0.0 -->
<!-- Version: 1.0.1-alpha.1 -->
<!-- Copyright 2024 Jake Winters -->
<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause -->
<urlset xmlns="http://www.sitemaps.org/schemas/sitemap/0.9"
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
<urlset xmlns="http://www.sitemaps.org/schemas/sitemap/0.9" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.sitemaps.org/schemas/sitemap/0.9 http://www.sitemaps.org/schemas/sitemap/0.9/sitemap.xsd">
<url>
<loc>https://inferencium.net/</loc>

2
source.xhtml
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@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<!DOCTYPE html>
<!-- Inferencium - Website - Source -->
<!-- Version: 8.0.0 -->
<!-- Version: 8.0.1-alpha.1 -->
<!-- Copyright 2022 Jake Winters -->
<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause -->